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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of minimizing regret in discounted-sum games played on
weighted game graphs. We give algorithms for the general problem of computing the minimal regret
of the controller (Eve) as well as several variants depending on which strategies the environment
(Adam) is permitted to use. We also consider the problem of synthesizing regret-free strategies for
Eve in each of these scenarios.
1 Introduction
Two-player games played by Eve and Adam on weighted graphs is a well accepted mathematical formalism
for modelling quantitative aspects of a controller (Eve) interacting with its environment (Adam). The
outcome of the interaction between the two players is an infinite path in the weighted graph and a value
is associated to this infinite path using a measure such as e.g. the mean-payoff of the weights of edges
traversed by the infinite path, or the discounted sum of those weights. In the classical model, the game
is considered to be zero sum: the two players have antagonistic goals–one of the player want to maximize
the value associated to the outcome while the other want to minimize this value. The main solution
concept is then the notion of winning strategy and the main decision problem asks, given a threshold c,
whether Eve has a strategy to ensure that, no matter how Adam plays, that the outcome has a value
larger than or equal to c.
When the environment is not fully antagonistic, it is reasonable to study other solution concepts.
One interesting concept to explore is the concept of regret minimization [3] which is as follows. When
a strategy of Adam is fixed, we can identify the set of Eve’s strategies that allow her to secure the best
possible outcome against this strategy. This constitutes Eve’s best response. Then we define the regret
of a strategy σ of Eve as the difference between Eve’s best response; and the payoff she secures thanks
to her strategy σ. So, when trying to minimize the regret associated to a strategy, we use best responses
as a yardstick. Let us now illustrate this with an example.
Example 1 (Investment advice). Consider the discounted sum game of Fig. 2. It models the rentability
of different investment plans with a time horizon of two periods. In the first period, it can be decided to
invest in treasure bonds (B) or to invest in the stock market (S). In the former case, treasure bonds (B)
are chosen for two periods. In the latter case, after one period, there is again a choice for either treasure
bonds (B) or stock market (S). The returns of the different investments depend on the fluctuation of the
rate of interests. When the rate of interests is low (L) then the return for the stock market investments
is equal to 12 and for the treasure bonds it is equal to 8. When the interest rate is high (H) then the
returns for the stock market investments is equal to −4 and for the treasure bonds it is equal to −2. To
model time and take into account the inflation rate, say equal to 2 percent, we consider a discount factor
λ = 0.98 for the returns. In this example, we make the hypothesis that the fluctuation of the rate of
interests is not a function of the behavior of the investor. It means that this fluctuation rate is either one
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Figure 1: A game in which waiting
is required to minimize regret.
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Figure 2: A game that models different investment strategies.
HH HL LH LL Worst-case Regret
SS −7.7616 7.6048 7.9784 23.2848 −7.7616 3.8808
SB −5.8408 3.7632 9.8392 19.4432 −5.8408 3.8416
BB −3.8808 5.7232 5.9192 15.5232 −3.8808 7.7616
Table 1: The possible rate configuration for the rate of interests are given as the first four columns, the
follows the worst-case performance and the regret associated to each strategy of Eve that are given in
rows. Entries in bold are the values that are maximizing the worst-case (strategy BB) and minimizing
the regret (strategy SB).
of the following four possibilities: HH, HL, LH, LL. This corresponds to Adam playing a word strategy in
our terminology. The discounted sum of returns obtained under the 12 different scenarios are given in
Table 1.
Now, assume that you are a broker and you need to advise one of your customers regarding his next
investment. There are several ways to advise your customer. First, if your customer is strongly risk
averse, then you should be able to convince him that he has to go for the treasure bonds (B). Indeed,
this is the choice that maximizes the worst-case: if the interest rates stay high for two periods (HH)
then the loss will be −3.8808 while it will be higher for any other choices. Second, and maybe more
interestingly, if your customer tolerates some risks, then you may want to keep him happy so that he
will continue to ask for your advice in the future! Then you should propose the following strategy: first
invest in the stock market (S) then in treasure bonds (B) as this strategy minimizes regret. Indeed, at
the end of the two investment periods, the actual interest rates will be known and so your customer will
evaluate your advices ex-post. So, after the two periods, the value of the choices made ex ante can be
compared to the best strategy that could have been chosen knowing the evolution of the interest rates.
The regret of SB is at most equal to 3.8416 in all cases and it is minimal: the regret of BB can be as
high as 7.7616 if LL is observed, and the regret of SS can be as high as 3.8808.
Finally, let us remark that if the investments are done in financial markets that are subject to different
interest rates, then instead of considering the minimization of regret against word strategies, then we
could consider the regret against all strategies. We also study this case in this paper.
Previous works. In [9], we studied regret minimization in the context of reactive synthesis for
shortest path objectives. Recently in [13], we studied the notion of regret minimization when we assume
different sets of strategies from which Adam chooses. We have considered three cases: when the Adam is
allowed to play any strategy, when he is restricted to play a memoryless strategy, and when he plays word
strategies. We refer the interested reader to [13] for motivations behind each of these definitions. In that
paper, we studied the regret minimization problem for the following classical quantitative measures: inf,
sup, lim inf, lim sup and the mean-payoff measure. In this paper, we complete this picture by studying
the regret minimization problem for the discounted-sum measure. Discounted-sum is a central measure
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Any strategy Memoryless strategies Word strategies
regret threshold NP PSPACE (Thm. 3), PSPACE-c (ε-gap)
(Thm. 1) coNP-h (Thm. 5) (Thm. 8, Thm. 9)
regret-free PTIME PSPACE (Thm. 4), NP-c (Thm. 6)
(Thm. 2) coNP-h (Thm. 5)
Table 2: Complexity of deciding the regret threshold and regret-free problems for fixed λ.
in quantitative games but we did not consider it in [13] because it requires specific techniques which are
more involved than the ones used for the other quantitative measures. For example, while for mean-
payoff objectives, strategies that minimize regret are memoryless when the Adam can play any strategy,
we show in this paper that pseudo-polynomial memory is necessary (and sufficient) to minimize regret
in discounted-sum games. The need for memory is illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Consider the example in Figure 1 where M ≫ 1. Eve can play the following strategies in
this game: let i ∈ N ∪ {∞}, and note σi the strategy that first plays i rounds the edge (vI , v) and then
switches to (vI , x). The regret values associated to those strategies are as follows.
The regret of σ∞ is 11−λ and it is witnessed when Adam never plays the edge (v, y). Indeed, the
discounted sum of the outcome in that case is 0, while if Eve had chosen to play (vI , x) at the first step
instead, then she would have gained 11−λ . The regret of σ
i is equal to the maximum between 11−λ−λ
2i 1
1−λ
and λ2i+1 M1−λ − λ
2i 1
1−λ . The maximum is either witnessed when Adam never plays (v, y) or plays (v, y)
if the edge (vI , x) has been chosen i+ 1 times (one more time compared to σ
i).
So the strategy that minimizes regret is the strategy σN for N > − logM2 log λ −
1
2 (so that λ
2N+1M < 1),
i.e. the strategy needs to count up to N .
Contributions. We describe algorithms to decide the regret threshold problem for games in three
cases: when there is no restriction on the strategies that Adam can play, when Adam can only play
memoryless strategies, and when Adam can only play word strategies. For this last case, our problem is
closely related to open problems in the field of discounted-sum automata, and we also consider variants
given as ε-gap promise problems.
We also study the complexity of the special case when the threshold is 0, i.e. when we ask for the
existence of regret free strategies. We show that that problem is sometimes easier to solve. Our results
on the complexity of both the regret threshold and the regret-free problems are summarized in Table 2.
All our results are for fixed discount factor λ.
Other related works. A Boolean version of our regret-free strategies has been described in [7].
In that paper, they are called remorse-free strategies. These correspond to strategies which minimize
regret in games with ω-regular objectives. They do not establish lower bounds on the complexity of
realizability or synthesis of remorse-free strategies and they only consider word strategies for Adam.
In [13], we established that regret minimization when Adam plays word strategies only is a generaliza-
tion of the notion of good-for-games automata [11] and determinization by pruning (of a refinement) [1].
The notion of regret is closely related to the notion of competitive ratios used for the analysis of
online algorithms [14]: the performance of an online algorithm facing uncertainty (e.g. about the future
incoming requests or data) is compared to the performance of an offline algorithm (where uncertainty is
resolved). According to this quality measure, an online algorithm is better if its performance is closer to
the performance of an optimal offline solution.
Structure of the paper. In Sect. 2, we introduce the necessary definitions and notations. In
Sect. 3, we study the minimization of regret when the second player plays any strategy. Finally, in
Sect. 4, we study the minimization of regret when the second player plays a memoryless strategy and in
Sect. 5 when he plays a word strategy.
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2 Preliminaries
A weighted arena is a tuple G = (V, V∃, E, w, vI) where (V,E,w) is an edge-weighted graph (with
rational weights), V∃ ⊆ V , and vI ∈ V is the initial vertex. For a given v ∈ V we denote by succ(u)
the set of successors of u in G, that is the set {v ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}. We assume w.l.o.g. that no
vertex is a sink, i.e. ∀v ∈ V : |succ(v)| > 0, and that every Eve vertex has more than one successor,
i.e. ∀v ∈ V∃ : |succ(v)| > 1. In the sequel, we depict vertices in V∃ with squares and vertices in V \ V∃
with circles. We denote the maximum absolute value of a weight in a weighted arena by W .
A play in a weighted arena is an infinite sequence of vertices π = v0v1 . . . where (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for
all i. Given a play π = v0v1 . . . and integers k, l we define π[k..l] := vk . . . vl, π[..k] := π[0..k], and
π[l..] := vlvl+1 . . . , all of which we refer to as play prefixes. To improve readability, we try to adhere to
the following convention: use π to denote plays and ρ for play prefixes. The length of a play π, denoted
|π|, is ∞, and the length of a play prefix ρ = v0 . . . vn, i.e. |ρ|, is n+ 1.
A strategy for Eve (Adam) is a function σ that maps play prefixes ending with a vertex v from V∃
(V \V∃) to a successor of v. A strategy has memory m if it can be realized as the output of a finite state
machine with m states (see e.g. [12] for a formal definition). A memoryless (or positional) strategy is a
strategy with memory 1, that is, a function that only depends on the last element of the given partial
play. A play π = v0v1 . . . is consistent with a strategy σ for Eve (Adam) if whenever vi ∈ V∃ (vi ∈ V \V∃),
then σ(π[..i]) = vi+1. We denote by S∃(G) (S∀(G)) the set of all strategies for Eve (Adam) and by
Σm∃ (G) (Σ
m
∀ (G)) the set of all strategies for Eve (Adam) in G that require memory of size at most m,
in particular Σ1∃(G) (Σ
1
∀(G)) is the set of all memoryless strategies for Eve (Adam) in G. We omit G if
the context is clear.
Given strategies σ, τ , for Eve and Adam respectively, and v ∈ V , we denote by πvστ the unique play
starting from v that is consistent with σ and τ . If v is omitted, it is assumed to be vI .
A weighted automaton is a tuple Γ = (Q, qI , A,∆, w) where A is a finite alphabet, Q is a finite set
of states, qI is the initial state, ∆ ⊆ Q × A × Q is the transition relation, w : ∆ → Q assigns weights
to transitions. A run of Γ on a word a0a1 · · · ∈ Aω is a sequence ρ = q0a0q1a1 · · · ∈ (Q × A)ω such
that (qi, ai, qi+1) ∈ ∆, for all i ≥ 0, and has value Val(ρ) determined by the sequence of weights of
the transitions of the run and the payoff function Val. The value Γ assigns to a word w, Γ(w), is the
supremum of the values of all runs on the word. We say the automaton is deterministic if ∆ is functional.
Safety games. A safety game is played on a non-weighted arena by Eve and Adam. The goal of
Eve is to perpetually avoid traversing edges from a set of bad edges, while Adam attempts to force the
play through any unsafe edge. More formally, a safety game is a tuple (G,B) where G = (V, V∃, E, vI)
is a non-weighted arena and B ⊆ E is the set of bad edges. A play π = v0v1 . . . is winning for Eve if
(vi, vi+1) 6∈ B, for all i ≥ 0, and it is winning for Adam otherwise. A strategy for Eve (Adam) is winning
for her (him) in the safety game if all plays consistent with it are winning for her (him). A player wins
the safety game if (s)he has a winning strategy.
Lemma 1 (from [2]). Safety games are positionally determined: either Eve has a positional winning
strategy or Adam has a positional strategy. Determining the winner in a safety game is decidable in
linear time.
Discounted-sum. A play in a weighted arena, or a run in a weighted automaton, induces an infinite
sequence of weights. We define below the discounted-sum payoff function which maps finite and infinite
sequences of rational weights to real numbers. In the sequel we refer to a weighted arena together with a
payoff function as a game. Formally, given a sequence of weights χ = x0x1 . . . of length n ∈ N∪{∞}, the
discounted-sum is defined by a rational discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1): DSλ(χ) :=
∑n
i=0 λ
ixi. For convenience,
we apply payoff functions directly to plays, runs, and prefixes. For instance, given a play or play prefix
π = v0v1 . . . we write DSλ(π) instead DSλ(w(v0, v1)w(v1, v2) . . . ).
Consider a fixed weighted arena G, and a discounted-sum payoff function Val = DSλ for some
λ ∈ (0, 1). Given strategies σ, τ , for Eve and Adam respectively, and v ∈ V , we denote the value of πvστ
by ValvG(σ, τ) := Val(π
v
στ ). We omit G if it is clear from the context. If v is omitted, it is assumed to
be vI .
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Antagonistic & co-operative values. Two values associated with a weighted arena that we will
use throughout are the antagonistic and co-operative values, defined for plays from a vertex v ∈ V as:
aVal
v(G) := supσ∈S∃ infτ∈S∀ Val
v(σ, τ) cValv(G) := supσ∈S∃ supτ∈S∀ Val
v(σ, τ).
Again, if G is clear from the context it will be omitted, and if v is omitted it is assumed to be vI . We
note that, as memoryless strategies are sufficient in discounted-sum games [15], aVal can be computed
in time polynomial (in 11−λ , |V |, and log2W ). If λ is given as part of the input, this becomes exponential
(in the size of the input). Regardless of whether λ is part of the input, cVal is computable in polynomial
time, determining if aVal is bigger (or smaller) than a given threshold is decidable and in NP ∩ coNP,
and the values cVal and aVal are representable using a polynomial number of bits.
A useful observation used by Zwick and Paterson in [15], and which is implicitly used throughout
this work, is the following.
Remark 1. For all u ∈ V , cValu(G) = max{w(u, v) + λcValv(G) : (u, v) ∈ E}. For all u ∈ V∃,
aValu(G) = max{w(u, v) + λaValv(G) : (u, v) ∈ E}. For all u ∈ V \ V∃, aVal
u(G) = min{w(u, v) +
λaValv(G) : (u, v) ∈ E}.
We say a strategy σ for Eve is worst-case optimal (maximizing) from v ∈ V if it holds that
infτ∈S∀ Val
v(σ, τ) = aValv(G). Similarly, a strategy τ for Adam is worst-case optimal (minimizing)
from v ∈ V if it holds that supσ∈S∃ Val
v(σ, τ) = aValv(G). Also, a pair of strategies σ, τ for Eve and
Adam, respectively, is said to be co-operative optimal from v ∈ V if Valv(σ, τ) = cValv(G).
Lemma 2 (from [15]). The following hold:
• there exists σ ∈ S∃ which is worst-case optimal maximizing from all v ∈ V ,
• there exists τ ∈ S∀ which is worst-case optimal minimizing from all v ∈ V ,
• there are σ ∈ S∃ and τ ∈ S∀ which are co-operative optimal from all v ∈ V .
We now recall the definition of a strongly co-operative optimal strategy σ for Eve. Formally, for any
play prefix ρ = v0 . . . vn consistent with σ, and such that vn ∈ V∃ if σ(ρ) = v
′, then v′ ∈ cOpt(vn);
where cOpt(u) := {v ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E and cValu(G) = w(u, v) + λcValv(G)}. Finally, we define a new
type of strategy for Eve: co-operative worst-case optimal strategies. A strategy is of this type if, for any
play prefix ρ = v0 . . . vn consistent with σ, and such that vn ∈ V∃, if σ(ρ) = v′ then v′ ∈ wOpt(vn) and
w(vn, v
′) + λcValv
′
(G) = max{w(vn, v
′′) + λcValv
′′
(G) : v′′ ∈ wOpt(vn)},
where wOpt(u) := {v ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E and aValu(G) = w(u, v) + λaValv(G)}.
It is not hard to verify that strategies of the above types always exist for Eve.
Lemma 3. There exist strongly co-operative optimal strategies and co-operative worst-case optimal strate-
gies for Eve.
Regret. Let Σ∃ ⊆ S∃ and Σ∀ ⊆ S∀ be sets of strategies for Eve and Adam respectively. Given
σ ∈ Σ∃ we define the regret of σ in G w.r.t. Σ∃ and Σ∀ as:
regσΣ∃,Σ∀(G) := supτ∈Σ∀(supσ′∈Σ∃ Val(σ
′, τ)−Val(σ, τ)).
A strategy σ for Eve is then said to be regret-free w.r.t. Σ∃ and Σ∀ if reg
σ
Σ∃,Σ∀
(G) = 0. We define the
regret of G w.r.t. Σ∃ and Σ∀ as:
RegΣ∃,Σ∀(G) := infσ∈Σ∃ reg
σ
Σ∃,Σ∀
(G).
When Σ∃ or Σ∀ are omitted from reg(·) and Reg(·) they are assumed to be the set of all strategies for
Eve and Adam.
In the unfolded definition of the regret of a game, i.e.
RegΣ∃,Σ∀(G) := infσ∈Σ∃ supτ∈Σ∀(supσ′∈Σ∃ Val(σ
′, τ)−Val(σ, τ)),
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let us refer to the witnesses σ and σ′ as the primary strategy and the alternative strategy respectively.
Observe that for any primary strategy for Eve and any one strategy for Adam, we can assume Adam plays
to maximize the payoff (i.e. co-operates) against the alternative strategy once it deviates (necessarily at
an Eve vertex) or to minimize against the primary strategy—again, once it deviates. Indeed, since the
deviation yields different histories, the two strategies for Adam can be combined without conflict. More
formally,
Lemma 4. Consider any σ ∈ S∃, τ ∈ S∀, and corresponding play πστ = v0v1 . . . . For all i ≥ 0 such that
vi ∈ V∃, for all v′ ∈ succ(vi)\{vi+1} there exist σ′ ∈ S∃, τ ′ ∈ S∀ for which (i) πσ′τ [..i+1] = πστ [..i] ·v
′,
(ii) Val(πσ′τ ′ [i+ 1..]) = cVal
v′(G), and (iii) πστ = πστ ′ .
Lemma 5. Consider any σ ∈ S∃, τ ∈ S∀, and corresponding play πστ = v0v1 . . . . For all i ≥ 0 such
that vi ∈ V∃, for all v′ ∈ succ(vi) \ {vi+1} there exist σ′ ∈ S∃, τ ′ ∈ S∀ for which (i) πσ′τ [..i + 1] =
πστ [..i] · v
′ = πστ ′ [..i] · v
′, (ii) Val(πσ′τ ′ [i+1..]) = cVal
v′(G), and (iii) Val(πστ ′ [i+1..]) ≤ aVal
vi+1(G).
Both claims follow from the definitions of strategies for Eve and Adam and from Lemma 2.
In the remaining of this work, we will assume that λ is not given as part of the input.
3 Regret against all strategies of Adam
In this section we describe an algorithm to compute the (minimal) regret of a discounted-sum game when
there are no restrictions placed on the strategies of Adam. The algorithm can be implemented by an
alternating machine guaranteed to halt in polynomial time. We show that the regret value of any game
is achieved by a strategy for Eve which consists of two strategies, the first choosing edges which lead
to the optimal co-operative value, the second choosing edges which ensure the antagonistic value. The
switch from the former to the latter is done based on the “local regret” of the vertex (this is formalized in
the sequel). The latter allows us to claim NP-membership of the regret threshold problem. The following
theorem summarizes the bounds we obtain:
Theorem 1. Deciding if the regret value is less than a given threshold (strictly or non-strictly), playing
against all strategies of Adam, is in NP.
Let us start by formalizing the concept of local regret. Given a play or play prefix π = v0 . . . and
integer 0 ≤ i < |π| such that vi ∈ V∃, define locreg(π, i) as follows:

λi
(
cVal
vi
¬vi+1(G)−Val(π[i..])
)
if π is a play,
λi
(
cValvi¬vi+1(G)−Val(π[i..j])
)
− λjaValvj (G) if π is a prefix of length j + 1 > i+ 1,
λi (cValvi(G)− aValvi(G)) if π is a prefix of length i+ 1,
where cValvi¬vi+1(G) = max{w(vi, v) + λcVal
v(G) : (vi, v) ∈ E and v 6= vi+1}. Intuitively, for π a play,
locreg(π, i) corresponds to the difference between the value of the best deviation from position i and
the value of π. For π a play prefix, locreg(π, i) assumes that after position j = |π| − 1 Eve will play a
worst-case optimal strategy.
Deciding 0-regret. We will now argue that the problem of determining whether Eve has a regret-
free strategy can be decided in polynomial time. Furthermore, if no such strategy for Eve exists, we
will extract a strategy for Adam which, against any strategy of Eve, ensures non-zero regret. To do so,
we will reduce the problem to that of deciding whether Eve wins a safety game. The unsafe edges are
determined by a function of the antagonistic and co-operative values of the original game. Critically, the
game is played on the same arena as the original regret game.
Theorem 2. Deciding if the regret value is 0, playing against all strategies of Adam, is in PTIME.
Proof. We define a partition of the edges leaving vertices from V∃ into good and bad for Eve. A bad
edge is one which witnesses non-zero local regret. We then show that Eve can ensure a regret value of 0
if and only if she has a strategy to avoid ever traversing bad edges. More formally, let us assume a given
6
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Figure 3: Depiction of a play and a “better alter-
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Figure 4: A deviation from vk cannot be a best
alternative to πστ if j ≥ N(Val(σ
′, τ)−Val(σ, τ)).
weighted arena G = (V, V∃, vI , E, w) and a discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1). We define the set of bad edges
B := {(u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ V∃ and w(u, v) + λaVal
v(G) < cValu¬v(G)}.
Note that strategies for either player in the newly defined safety game are also strategies for them
in the original game (and vice versa as well). We now claim that winning strategies for Adam in the
safety game Gˆ = (V, V∃, vI , E,B) ensure that, regardless of the strategy of Eve, its regret will be strictly
positive. The idea behind the claim is that, Adam can force to traverse a bad edge and from there, play
adversarially against the primary strategy and co-operatively with an alternative strategy.
Claim 1. If τ ∈ S∀ is a winning strategy for Adam in Gˆ, then there exist τ ′ ∈ S∀ and σ′ ∈ S∃ such that
∀σ ∈ S∃ : Val(σ′, τ ′) −Val(σ, τ ′) ≥ λ|V |min{cVal
u
¬v(G) − w(u, v) − λaVal
v(G) : (u, v) ∈ B and u ∈
V∃} > 0.
The claim follows from the definitions and Lemma 5. Conversely, winning strategies for Eve in Gˆ are
actually regret-free.
Claim 2. If σ ∈ S∃ is a winning strategy for Eve in Gˆ, then regσ(G) = 0.
Our argument to prove this claim requires we first show that a winning strategy for Eve ensures the
antagonistic value of G from vI . For completeness, a proof for this claim is included in appendix.
The desired result then follows from Lemma 1 and from the fact that membership of an edge in B
can be decided by computing cV al and a threshold query regarding aVal, thus in polynomial time.
We observe the proof of Theorem 2—more precisely, Claim 1—implies that, if there is no regret-free
strategy for Eve in a game, then the regret of the game is at least λ|V | times the smallest local regret
labelling the bad edge from B which Adam can force. More formally:
Corollary 1. If no regret-free strategy for Eve exists in G, thenReg(G) ≥ aG where aG := λ|V |min{locreg(uv, 0) :
u ∈ V∃ and (u, v) ∈ B}.
Deciding r-regret. It will be useful in the sequel to define the regret of a play and the regret of a
play prefix. Given a play π = v0v1 . . . , we define the regret of π as:
reg(π) := (sup{locreg(π, i) : vi ∈ V∃} ∪ {0}) .
Intuitively, the local regrets give lower bounds for the overall regret of a play. We will also let the regret
of a play prefix ρ = v0 . . . vj be equal to
max
(
{λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G)−Val(ρ[i..j])) : 0 ≤ i < j and vi ∈ V∃} ∪ {0}
)
.
Let us give some more intuition regarding the regret of a play. Consider a pair of strategies σ and τ
for Eve and Adam, respectively. Suppose there is an alternative strategy σ′ for Eve, such that, against
τ , the obtained payoff is greater than that of πστ . It should be clear that this implies there is some
position i such that, from vertex vi ∈ V∃ σ′ and τ result in a different play from πστ (see Figure 3). We
will sometimes refer to this deviation, i.e. the play πσ′τ , as a better alternative to πστ .
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We can now show the regret of a strategy for Eve in fact corresponds to the supremum of the regret
of plays consistent with the strategy.
Lemma 6. For any strategy σ of Eve, regσ(G) = sup{reg(π) : π is consistent with σ}.
We note that for any play π, the sequence 〈λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G)−Val(π[i..]))〉i≥0 converges to 0 because
(cValvi¬vi+1(G) − Val(π[i..])) is bounded by
2W
(1−λ) . It follows that if we have a non-zero lower bound
for the regret of π, then there is some index N such that the witness for the regret occurs before N .
Moreover, we can place a polynomial upper bound on N . More precisely:
Lemma 7. Let π be a play in G and suppose 0 < r ≤ reg(π). Let
N(r) := ⌊(log r + log(1− λ) − log(2W ))/ logλ⌋+ 1.
Then reg(π) = reg(π[..N(r)])− λN(r)Val(π[N(r)..]).
The above result gives us a bound on how far we have to unfold a game after having witnessed a
non-zero lower bound, r, for the regret. If we consider the example from Figure 3, this translates into a
bound on how many turns after vi a deviation can still yield bigger local regret (see Figure 4).
Corollary 1 then gives us the required lower bound to be able to use Lemma 7.
Lemma 8. If Reg(G) ≥ aG then Reg(G) is equal to
inf
σ∈S∃
sup{reg(π[..N(aG)])− λ
N(aG)aValvN(aG)(G) : π = v0v1 . . . is consistent with σ}.
This already implies we can compute the regret value in alternating polynomial time (or equivalently,
deterministic polynomial space [5]).
Proposition 1. The regret value is computable using only polynomial space.
Proof. We first label the arena with the antagonistic and co-operative values and solve the safety game
described for Theorem 2. The latter can be done in polynomial time. If the Eve wins the safety game,
the regret value is 0. Otherwise, we know aG > 0 is a lower bound for the regret value. We now simulate
G using an alternating Turing machine which halts in at most N(aG) steps. That is, a polynomial
number of steps. The simulated play prefix is then assigned a regret value as per Lemma 8 (recall we
have already pre-computed the antagonistic value of every vertex).
As a side-product of the algorithm described in the above proof we get that finite memory strategies
suffice for Eve to minimize her regret in a discounted-sum game.
Corollary 2. Let µ := |∆|N(aG), with N(0) = 0. It holds that
RegΣµ∃ ,S∀
(G) = RegS∃,S∀(G).
Simple regret-minimizing behaviours. We will now argue that Eve has a simple strategy which
ensures regret of at most Reg(G). Her strategy will consist in “playing co-operatively” (i.e., a strategy
that attempts to maximize the co-operative payoff) for some turns (until a high local regret has already
been witnessed) and then switch to a co-operative worst-case optimal strategy (i.e., a strategy attempting
to maximize the co-operative payoff while achieving at least the antagonistic payoff).
We will now define a family of strategies which switch from co-operative behaviour to antagonistic,
after a specific number of turns have elapsed (in fact, enough for the discounted local regret to be less
than the desired regret). Denote by σco a strongly co-operative strategy for Eve in G and by σcw a
co-operative worst-case optimal strategy for Eve in G. Recall that, by Lemma 3, such strategies for her
always exist. Finally, given a co-operative strategy σco, a co-operative worst-case optimal strategy σcw,
and t ∈ Q let us define an optimistic-then-pessimistic strategy for Eve [σco
t
→ σcw]. The strategy is such
that, for any play prefix ρ = v0 . . . vn such that vn ∈ V∃
[σco
t
→ σcw](ρ) =
{
σco(ρ) if |cOpt(vn)| = 1 and locreg(ρ · σcw(ρ), n+ 1) > t
σcw(ρ) otherwise.
We claim that, when we set t = Reg(G), an optimistic-then-pessimistic strategy for Eve ensures
minimal regret. That is
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Proposition 2. Let σco be a strongly co-operative strategy for Eve, σcw be a Eve and a co-operative
worst-case optimal strategy for Eve, and t = Reg(G). The strategy σ = [σco
t
→ σcw] has the property
that regσ(G) = Reg(G).
This is a refinement of the strategy one can obtain from applying the algorithm used to prove
Proposition 1.1 The latter tells us that a regret-minimizing strategy of Eve eventually switches to a
worst-case optimal behaviour. For vertices where, before this switch, another edge was chosen by Eve,
we argue that she must have been playing a co-operative strategy. Otherwise, she could have switched
sooner. A full proof is provided in Appendix A.5.
We have shown the regret value can be computed using an algorithm which requires polynomial space
only. This algorithm is based on a polynomial-length unfolding of the game and from it we can deduce
that the regret value is representable using a polynomial number of bits. (Indeed, all exponents ocurring
in the formula from Lemma 8 will be polynomial according to Lemma 7.) Also, we have argued that Eve
has a “simple” strategy σ to ensure minimal regret. Such a strategy is defined by two polynomial-time
constructible sub-strategies and the regret value of the game. Hence, it can be encoded into a polynomial
number of bits itself. Furthermore, σ is guaranteed to be playing as its co-operative worst-case optimal
component after N(Reg(G)) turns (see, again, Lemma 7), which is a polynomial number of turns. Given
a regret threshold r, we claim we can verify that σ ensures regret at most r in polynomial time. This
can be achieved by allowing Adam to play in G, and against σ, with the objective of reaching an edge
with high local regret before N(Reg(G)) turns. An possible formalization of this idea follows. Consider
the product of G with a counter ranging from 1 to N(Reg(G)) where we make all vertices belong to
Adam. In this game H , we make edges leaving vertices previously belonging to Eve go to a sink and
define a new weight function w′ which assigns to these edges their negative non-discounted local regret:
going from u to v when σ dictates to go to v′ yields w(u, v′) + λaValv
′
(H × σ)− w(u, v) + λcValv(H).
Lemma 8 allows us to show that σ ensures regret at most r in G if and only if the antagonistic value of
a discounted-sum game played on H with weight function w′ is at most −r.
It follows that the regret threshold problem is in NP, as stated in Theorem 1.
Example 3. We revisit the discounted-sum game from Figure 1. Let us instantiate the values M = 100
and λ = 910 . According to our previous remarks on this arena, after i visits to v without Adam choosing
(v, y), Eve could achieve ( 910 )
2i10 by going to x or hope for ( 910 )
2i+11000 by going to v again. Her best
regret minimizing strategy corresponds to σ22 which ensures regret of at most 9.9030 = 10 − ( 910 )
4410.
It is easy to see that Eve cannot win the safety game Gˆ constructed from this arena and that the lower
bound aG one can obtain from Gˆ is equal to 1.2466 = (
9
10 )
4(10− ( 910 )
210). As expected, when Eve plays
her optimal regret-minimizing (optimistic-then-pessimistic) strategy any better alternative must deviate
before N(aG) = 71 turns. Indeed, we have already argued that the regret 9.9030 is witnessed by Adam
choosing the edge (v, y) for any strategy of Eve going to v more than 22 times.
4 Regret against positional strategies of Adam
In this section we consider the problem of computing the (minimal) regret when Adam is restricted to
playing positional strategies.
Theorem 3. Deciding if the regret value is less than a given threshold (strictly or non-strictly), playing
against positional strategies of Adam, is in PSPACE.
Playing against an Adam, when he is restricted to playing memoryless strategies gives Eve the
opportunity to learn some of Adam’s strategic choices. However, due to its decaying nature, with the
discounted-sum payoff function Eve must find a balance between exploring too quickly, thereby presenting
lightly discounted alternatives; and learning too slowly, thereby heavily discounting her eventual payoff.
A similar approach to the one we have adopted in Section 3 can be used to obtain an algorithm for
this setting. For reasons of space we defer its presentation to the appendix. The claimed lower bound
follows from Theorem 5.
1In fact, our proof of Prop. 2 relies in Eve requiring finite memory, to minimize her regret.
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Deciding 0-regret. As in the previous section, we will reduce the problem of deciding if the game
has regret value 0 to that of determining the winner of a safety game. It will be obvious that if no
regret-free strategy for Eve exists in the original game, then we can construct, for any strategy of hers,
a positional strategy of Adam which ensures non-zero regret. Hence, we will also obtain a lower bound
on the regret of the game in the case Adam wins the safety game.
Let us fix some notation. For a set of edges D ⊆ E, we denote by G⇂D the weighted arena
(V, V∃, vI , D,w). Also, for a positional strategy τ : (V \ V∃) → E for Adam in G, we denote by G × τ
the weighted arena resulting from removing all edges not consistent with τ . Next, for an edge (s, t) ∈ E
we define E∀(st) := {(u, v) ∈ E : if u = s then v = t or u ∈ V∃}. We extend the latter to play pre-
fixes ρ = v0 . . . vn by (recursively) defining E∀(ρ) := E∀(ρ[..n − 1]) ∩ E∀(vn−1vn). If π is a play, then
E ⊇ E∀(π[..i]) ⊇ E∀(π[..j]) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ j. Hence, since E is finite, the value E∀(π) := limi≥0 E∀(π[..i])
is well-defined. Remark that E∀(π) does not restrict edges leaving vertices of Eve. The following prop-
erties directly follow from our definitions.
Lemma 9. Let π be a play or play prefix consistent with a positional strategy for Adam. It then holds
that: (i) for every v ∈ V \ V∃ there is some edge (v, ·) ∈ E∀(π), (ii) π is consistent with a strategy
τ ∈ Σ1∀(G) if and only if τ ∈ Σ
1
∀(G⇂E∀(π)), and (iii) every strategy τ ∈ Σ
1
∀(G⇂E∀(π)) is also an element
from Σ1∀(G).
To be able to decide whether regret-free strategies for Eve exist, we define a new safety game. The
arena we consider is Gˆ := (Vˆ , Vˆ∃, vˆI , Eˆ) where Vˆ := V × P(E), Vˆ∃ := V∃ × P(E), vˆI := (vI , E), and Eˆ
contains the edge ((u,C), (v,D)) if and only if (u, v) ∈ E and D = C ∩E∀(uv).
Theorem 4. Deciding if the regret value is 0, playing against positional strategies of Adam, is in PSPACE.
Proof. A safety game is constructed as in the proof of Theorem 2. Here, we consider G˜ and the set of bad
edges B˜ := {((u,C), (v,D)) ∈ Eˆ : u ∈ V∃ and ∃τ ∈ Σ1∀(G⇂C), w(u, v)+λcVal
v(G×τ) < cValu¬v(G×τ)}.
We then have the safety game G˜ = (Vˆ , Vˆ∃, vˆI , Eˆ, B˜). Note that there is an obvious bijective mapping
from plays (and play prefixes) in G˜ to plays (prefixes) in G which are consistent with a positional strategy
for Adam. One can then show the following properties hold:
Claim 3. If τ ∈ S∀(G˜) is a winning strategy for Adam in G˜, then for all σ ∈ S∃(G), there exist
tτσ ∈ Σ1∀(G) and sτσ ∈ S∃(G) such that Val(sτσ, tτσ)−Val(σ, tτσ) ≥ λ
|V |(|E|+1)
min{cValu¬v(G× τ)− w(u, v)− λcVal
v(G× τ) : ((u,C), (v,D)) ∈ B˜, τ ∈ Σ1∀(G⇂C)}.
The claim follows from positional determinacy of safety games and Lemma 9 (see Appendix B.1).
Claim 4. If σ ∈ S∃(G˜) is a winning strategy for Eve in G˜, then there is sσ ∈ S∃(G) such that
regsσ
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) = 0.
It then follows from the determinacy of safety games that Eve wins the safety game G˜ if and only if
she has a regret-free strategy. We provide full proofs for these claims in appendix.
We observe that simple cycles in G˜ have length at most |V |(|E|+1). Thus, we can simulate the safety
game until we complete a cycle and check that all traversed edges are good, all in alternating polynomial
time. Indeed, an alternating Turing machine can simulate the cycle and then (universally) check that
for all edges, for all positional strategies of the Adam, the inequality holds.
Corollary 3. If no regret-free strategy for Eve exists in G, then Reg
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) ≥ bG where bG :=
λ|V |(|E|+1)min{cValu¬v(G× τ) − w(u, v)− λcVal
v(G× τ) : ((u,C), (v,D)) ∈ B˜ and τ ∈ Σ1∀(G⇂C)}.
Lower bounds. We claim that both 0-regret and r-regret are coNP-hard. This can be shown
by adapting the reduction from 2-disjoint-paths given in [13] to the regret threshold problem against
memoryless adversaries. For completeness, we provide the reductions here in appendix.
Theorem 5. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and r ∈ Q be fixed. Deciding if the regret value is less than r (strictly or
non-strictly), playing against positional strategies of Adam, is coNP-hard.
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5 Playing against word strategies of Adam
In this section, we consider the case where Adam is restricted to playing word strategies. First, we show
that the regret threshold problem can be solved whenever the discounted sum automata associated to the
game structure can be made deterministic. As the determinization problem for discounted sum automata
has been solved in the literature for only sub-classes of discount factors, and left open in the general case,
we complement this result by two other results. First, we show how to solve an ε-gap promise variant
of the regret threshold problem, and second, we give an algorithm to solve the 0 regret problem. In the
two cases, we obtain completeness results on the computational complexities of the problems.
Preliminaries. The formal definition of the ε-gap promise problem is given below. We first define
here the necessary vocabulary. We say that a strategy of Adam is a word strategy if his strategy can be
expressed as a function τ : N → [max{deg+(v) : v ∈ V }], where [n] = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Intuitively, we
consider an order on the successors of each Adam vertex. On every turn, the strategy τ of Adam will
tell him to move to the i-th successor of the vertex according to the fixed order. We denote by W∀ the
set of all such strategies for Adam. A game in which Adam plays word strategies can be reformulated
as a game played on a weighted automaton Γ = (Q, qI , A,∆, w) and strategies of Adam—of the form
τ : N → A—determine a sequence of input symbols, i.e. an omega word, to which Eve has to react by
choosing ∆-successor states starting from qI . In this setting a strategy of Eve which minimizes regret
defines a run by resolving the non-determinism of ∆ in Γ, and ensures the difference of value given by
the constructed run is minimal w.r.t. to the value of the best run on the word spelled out by Adam.
Deciding 0-regret. We will now show that if the regret of an arena (or automaton) is 0, then
we can construct a memoryless strategy for Eve which ensures no regret is incurred. More specifically,
assuming the regret is 0, we have the existence of a family of strategies of Eve which ensure decreasing
regret (with limit 0). We use this fact to choose a small enough ε and the corresponding strategy of hers
from the aforementioned family to construct a memoryless strategy for Eve with nice properties which
allow us to conclude that its regret is 0. Hence, it follows that an automaton has zero regret if and
only if a memoryless strategy of Eve ensures regret 0. As we can guess such a strategy and easily check
if it is indeed regret-free (using the obvious reduction to non-emptiness of discounted-sum automata
or one-player discounted-sum games), the problem is in NP. A matching lower bound follows from a
reduction from SAT which was first described in [1]. We sketch it, for completeness, in the appendix.
Theorem 6. Deciding if the regret value is 0, playing against word strategies of Adam, is NP-complete.
Deciding r-regret: determinizable cases. When the weighted automaton Γ associated to the
game structure can be made deterministic, we can solve the regret threshold problem with the following
algorithm. In [13] we established that, against eloquent adversaries, computing the regret reduced to
computing the value of a quantitative simulation game as defined in [6]. The game is obtained by taking
the product of the original automaton and a deterministic version of it. The new weight function is the
difference of the weights of both components (for each pair of transitions). In [4], it is shown how to
determinize discounted-sum automata when the discount factor is of the form 1
n
, for n ∈ N. So, for this
class of discount factor, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 7. Deciding if the regret value is less than a given threshold (strictly or non-strictly), playing
against word strategies of Adam, is in EXPTIME for λ of the form 1
n
.
The ε-gap promise problem. Given a discounted-sum automaton A, r ∈ Q, and ε > 0, the ε-gap
promise problem adds to the regret threshold problem the hypothesis that A will either have regret ≤ r
or > r + ε. We observe that an algorithm which gives:
• a YES answer implies that RegΣ∃,W∀(A) ≤ r + ε,
• whereas a NO answer implies RegΣ∃,W∀(A) > r.
will decide the ε-gap promise problem.
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In [4], it is shown that there are discounted-sum automata which define functions that cannot be
realized with deterministic-sum automata. Nevertheless, it is also shown in that paper that given a
discounted-sum automaton it is always possible to construct a deterministic one that is ε-close in the
following formal sense. A discounted-sum automaton A is ε-close to another discounted sum automaton
B, if for all words x the absolute value of the difference between the values assign by A and B to x is
at most ε. So, it should be clear that we can apply the algorithm underlying Theorem 7 to Γ and a
determinized version DΓ of it (which is ε-close to Γ) and solve the ε-gap promise problem. We can then
prove the following result.
Theorem 8. Deciding the ε-gap regret problem is in PSPACE.
The complexity of the algorithm follows from the fact that the value of a (quantitative simulation)
game, played on the product of Γ and DΓ we described above, can be determined by simulating the game
for a polynomial number of turns. Thus, although the automaton constructed using the techniques of
Boker and Henzinger [4] is of size exponential, we can construct it “on-the-fly” for the required number
of steps and then stop.
Lower bounds. We claim the ε-gap promise problem is PSPACE-hard even if both λ and ε are
not part of the input. To establish the result, we give a reduction from QSAT which uses the gadgets
depicted in Figures 11 and 12. For space reasons we defer the reduction to Appendix C.
Theorem 9. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈ (0, 1) be fixed. As input, assume we are given r ∈ Q and weighted
arena A such that RegΣ∃,W∀(A) ≤ r or RegΣ∃,W∀(A) > r + ε. Deciding if the regret value is less than
a given threshold, playing against word strategies of Adam, is PSPACE-hard.
It follows that the general problem is also PSPACE-hard (even if ε is set to 0).
Corollary 4. Let λ ∈ (0, 1). For r ∈ Q, weighted arena G, determining whether RegS∃,W∀(G)⊳ r, for
⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, is PSPACE-hard.
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A Missing Proofs From Section 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 6
Consider any σ, σ′ ∈ S∃ and τ ∈ S∀ such that πστ 6= πσ′τ . Let us write πστ = v0v1 . . . and πσ′τ =
v′0v
′
1 . . . and denote by ℓ the length of the longest common prefix of πστ and πσ′τ . We claim that
λℓ
(
cValvℓ¬vℓ+1(G)−Val(πστ )
)
≥ λℓ
(
Val(πσ′τ [ℓ..])−Val(πστ [ℓ..])
)
. (1)
Indeed, if we assume it is not the case, we then get that cValv
′
ℓ+1(G) < Val(πσ′τ [ℓ + 1..]), which
contradicts the definition of cVal. Note that Lemma 4 actually tells us that there is another strategy
τ ′ for Adam and a second alternative strategy σ′′ for Eve which give us equality in the above equation.
More formally, from Equation 1 and Lemma 4 we get that for all σ ∈ S∃, if there are τ ∈ S∀ and σ′ ∈ S∃
such that πστ 6= πσ′τ then
sup
τ,σ′ s.t. πστ 6=πσ′τ
λℓ
(
Val(πσ′τ [ℓ..])−Val(πστ [ℓ..])
)
= λℓ
(
cValvℓ¬vℓ+1(G)−Val(πστ )
)
. (2)
We are now able to prove the result. That is, for any strategy σ for Eve:
sup{reg(π) : π is consistent with σ}
= sup
τ∈S∀
reg(πστ = v0v1 . . . ) def. of πστ
= sup
τ∈S∀
max

0, supi≥0
vi∈V∃
λi
(
cValvi¬vi+1(G)−Val(πστ [i..])
)
 def. of reg(πστ )
= sup
τ∈S∀
max
{
0, sup
σ′s.t.πστ 6=πσ′τ
λℓ (Val(πσ′τ [ℓ..])−Val(πστ [ℓ..]))
}
by Eq. (2)
= sup
τ∈S∀
max
{
0, sup
σ′s.t.πστ 6=πσ′τ
(Val(σ′, τ) −Val(σ, τ))
}
def. of Val(·), ℓ
= sup
τ∈S∀
sup
σ′∈S∃
(Val(σ′, τ) −Val(σ, τ)) 0 when πστ = πσ′τ
as required.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 7
Observe that N(r) is such that 2Wλ
N(r)
1−λ < r. Hence, we have that for all i ≥ N(r) such that vi ∈ V∃ it
holds that λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G) −Val(π[i..])) ≤
2WλN(r)
1−λ < r. It follows that
reg(π) = sup{λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G) −Val(π[i..])) : i ≥ 0 and vi ∈ V∃}
= max
0≤i<N(r)
vi∈V∃
λi
(
cValvi¬vi+1(G) −Val(π[i..N(r)])
)
− λN(r)Val(π[N(r)..])
as required.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 8
First, note that if Reg(G) > 0 then there cannot be any regret-free strategies for Eve in G. It then
follows from Corollary 1 that Reg(G) ≥ aG. Next, using Lemma 7 and the definition of the regret of a
play we have that Reg(G) is equal to
inf
σ∈S∃
sup{reg(π[..N(aG)])− λ
N(aG)Val(π[N(aG)..]) : π is consistent with σ}.
14
Finally, note that it is in the interest of Eve to maximize the value λN(aG)Val(π[N(aG)..]) in order to
minimize regret. Conversely, Adam tries to minimize the same value. Thus, we can replace it by the
antagonistic value from π[N(aG)..] discounted accordingly. More formally, we have
inf
σ∈S∃
sup{reg(π[..N(aG)]) − λ
N(aG)Val(π[N(aG)..]) : π is consistent with σ}
= inf
σ∈S∃
sup
τ∈S∀
reg(πστ [..N(aG)])− λ
N(aG)Val(πστ [N(aG)..])
= inf
σ∈S∃
σ′∈S∃
sup
τ∈S∀
τ ′∈S∀
reg(πστ [..N(aG)] = . . . v)− λ
N(aG)Val
v(σ′, τ ′)
= inf
σ∈S∃
sup
τ∈S∀
reg(πστ [..N(aG)] = . . . v) + inf
σ′∈S∃
sup
τ ′∈S∀
(
−λN(aG)Valv(σ′, τ ′)
)
= inf
σ∈S∃
sup
τ∈S∀
reg(πστ [..N(aG)] = . . . v)− λ
N(aG)
(
sup
σ′∈S∃
inf
τ ′∈S∀
Valv(σ′, τ ′)
)
= inf
σ∈S∃
sup
τ∈S∀
reg(πστ [..N(aG)] = . . . v)− λ
N(aG)aValv(G)
as required.
A.4 Proof of Claim 2
As a first step towards proving the result, we first make the observation that any winning strategy of Eve
in Gˆ also ensures a value of at least aVal(G) in the discounted-sum game played on G. More formally,
Claim 5. If σ ∈ S∃ is a winning strategy for Eve in Gˆ, then
∀τ ∈ S∀, ∀i ≥ 0 : Val(πστ [i..] = vi . . . ) ≥ aVal
vi(G). (3)
Proof. Consider a winning strategy σ ∈ S∃ for Eve in Gˆ. Since safety games are positionally determined
(see, e.g. [2]) we can assume w.l.o.g. that σ is memoryless.
To convince the reader that σ has the property from Equation (3), we consider the synchronized
product of G and σ—that is, the synchronized product of G and the finite Moore machine realizing σ.
As σ is memoryless, then this product, which we denote in the sequel by G× σ, is finite. Now, towards
a contradiction, suppose that Equation (3) does not hold for σ. Further, let us consider an alternative
(memoryless) strategy σ′ of Eve which ensures aValv(G) from all v ∈ V . The latter exists by definition
of aVal(G) and memoryless determinacy of discounted-sum games (see, e.g. [15]).
Let H denote a copy of G × σ where all edges induced by E from G are added—not just the ones
allowed by σ—and H⇂σ′ denote the sub-graph of H where only edges allowed by σ′ are left. Since, by
assumption, σ does not have the property of Equation (3) then the edges present in at least one vertex
from H⇂σ′ and G × σ differ. Note that such a vertex u is necessarily such that u ∈ V∃. Furthermore,
from our definition of a strategy, we know that there is a single outgoing edge from it in both structures.
Let us write (u, v) for the edge in G × σ and (u, v′) for the edge in H⇂σ′. Recall that σ is winning for
Eve in Gˆ. Thus, we have that (u, v) 6∈ B = {(u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ V∃ and w(u, v)+λaVal
v(G) < cValu¬v(G)}.
It follows that
w(u, v) + λaValv(H) ≥ max
x 6=v
{w(u, x) + λcValx(H)}
≥ max
x 6=v
{w(u, x) + λaValx(H)} as cValx(H) ≥ aValx(H)
= aValu(H) because u ∈ V∃.
Thus, the strategy σ′′ of Eve which takes (u, v) instead of (u, v′) and follows σ′ otherwise—indeed, this
might mean σ′′ is not memoryless—also achieves at least aValu(H) from u onwards and is therefore
an worst-case optimal antagonistic strategy in G (i.e. it has the property of Equation (3)). Notice that
this process can be repeated for all vertices in which the two structures differ. Further, since both are
finite, it will eventually terminate and yield a strategy of Eve which plays exactly as σ and for which
Equation (3) holds, which is absurd.
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Once more, consider a winning strategy σ ∈ S∃ for Eve in Gˆ. We will now show that
∀τ ∈ S∀, ∀σ
′ ∈ S∃ \ {σ} : Val(σ, τ) ≥ Val(σ
′, τ).
The desired result will then directly follow.
Consider arbitrary strategies τ ∈ S∀ and σ
′ ∈ S∃ \ {σ}. Suppose that πστ 6= πσ′τ , as our claim
trivially holds otherwise. Let ι be the maximal index i ≥ 0 such that, if we write πστ = v0v1 . . . and
πσ′τ = v
′
0v
′
1 . . . , then vi = v
′
i. That is, ι is the maximal index for which the outcomes of σ and τ , and σ
′
and τ coincide. Note that vι is necessarily an Eve vertex, i.e. vι ∈ V∃. We observe that, by definition of
cVal, it holds that
Val(πσ′τ [ι+ 1..]) ≤ cVal
v′ι+1(G). (4)
Furthermore, we know from the fact that σ is winning for Eve in Gˆ that the edge (vι, vι+1) is such that
w(vι, vι+1) + λaVal
vι+1(G) ≥ max
t6=vι+1
{w(vι, t) + λcVal
t(G)}. (5)
In particular, this implies that w(vι, vι+1) + λaVal
vι+1(G) ≥ w(vι, v′ι+1) + λcVal
v′ι+1(G). It is then easy
to verify that w(vι, vι+1)+λaVal
vι+1(G) = aValvι(G) using the observation that vι ∈ V∃. From Claim 5
we also get that
Val(πστ [ι..]) ≥ aVal
vι(G). (6)
Putting all the above inequalities together, we have
Val(πστ [ι..]) ≥ aVal
vι(G) = w(vι, vι+1) + λaVal
vι+1(G) by Eqn. (6)
≥ w(vι, v
′
ι+1) + λcVal
v′ι+1(G) by Eqn. (5)
≥ Val(πσ′τ [ι..]) by Eqn. (4)
which, in turn, implies Val(σ, τ) ≥ Val(σ′, τ) since πστ [..ι] = πσ′τ [..ι].
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us start by showing that the regret of a play π is bounded (from above) by the discounted local
regret from any index i, where from the i-th turn onwards Eve plays a worst-case optimal strategy. More
formally:
Lemma 10. Let π = v0v1 . . . be a play. Assume there is some i ∈ N such that
(i) vi ∈ V∃;
(ii) reg(π) ≤ λireg(π[i..]); and
(iii) aValvj (G) = w(vj , vj+1) + λaVal
vj+1(G), for all j ≥ i.
It then holds that reg(π) ≤ λi (cValvi(G)− aValvi(G)).
Proof. If reg(π) = 0 then the claim holds trivially. Hence, let us assume reg(π) > 0. It follows from
Lemma 8 and Assumption (ii) that there exists k ≥ i such that vk ∈ V∃ and
reg(π) = λk
(
cValvk¬vk+1(G)− w(vk, vk+1)− λaVal
vk+1(G)
)
.
Observe that cValvk(G) ≥ cValvk¬vk+1(G), by definition, and that from Assumption (iii) we have that
aValvk(G) ≤ w(vk, vk+1) + λaVal
vk+1(G). Thus, we get that reg(π) ≤ λk (cValvk(G)− aValvk(G)).
Also, note that by definition of cVal we have that
cValvj (G) ≥ w(vj , vj+1) + λcVal
vj+1(G)
for all j ≥ 0. It thus follows from Assumption (iii) and the previous arguments that reg(π) ≤
λi (cValvi(G) − aValvi(G)) as required.
We are now ready to prove the Proposition holds.
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v′IvI
0
0
K + 1
−3K − 2
0
0
Figure 5: Gadget to reduce a game to its regret game.
The zero case. If Reg(G) = 0, then it follows from our reduction to safety games that Eve has a
co-operative worst-case optimal strategy which minimizes regret. Indeed, it is straightforward to show
that the strategy for Eve obtained from the safety game does not only ensure at least the antagonistic
value, but it is also co-operative worst-case optimal. Thus, since [σco
0
→ σcw] is clearly equivalent to σcw
in this case, the result follows.
Non-zero regret. Let us assume that Reg(G) > 0. It then follows from Lemma 8 that Eve
has a finite memory strategy σ which ensures regret of at most Reg(G) (see Corollary 2) and which,
furthermore, can be assumed to switch after turn N(aG) to a co-operative worst-case optimal strategy
σcw for Eve (since such a strategy ensures at least the antagonistic value of the vertex from which Eve
starts playing it). We will further assume, w.l.o.g., that for all play prefixes π = v0 . . . vn with n ≤ N(aG),
vn ∈ V∃ and having σcw(π) 6= σco(π) = σ(π), if σ switches to σcw from π onwards—that is, for all prefixes
extending π—then the regret of the resulting strategy is strictly greater than Reg(G). Otherwise, one
can consider the strategy resulting from the previously described switch instead of σ.
We will now argue that for all play prefixes π = v0 . . . vn with n ≤ N(aG) and vn ∈ V∃, if σ(π) 6= σcw
then cOpt(vn) is a singleton and locregπ[..n] · σcw(π[..n])n+ 1 > Reg(G). The desired result will follow
since in order for our assumption of reg(σ) = Reg(G) to be true Eve must then choose the unique edge
leading to the single element in cOpt(vn).
Let us consider two cases.
First, if locregπ[..n] · σcw(π[..n])n+ 1 ≤ Reg(G), we can switch to σcw fron π[..n] onwards. Contra-
dicting our initial assumption.
Second, if |cOpt(vn)| > 1 and locregπ[..n] · σcw(π[..n])n+ 1 > Reg(G), then by Lemma 10 we get
that the regret of the play (if we switched to σcw) is bounded above by λn (cValvn(G) − aValvn(G)).
Also, since cOpt(vn) is not a singleton, if Eve does not switch, then she cannot ensure a local regret of
less than λn (cValvn(G)− aValvn(G))—particularly, not even by taking an edge leading to a vertex in
cOpt(vn). This contradicts the assumption that that switching to σ
cw yields strictly more regret.
A.6 Lower bound
We now establish a lower bound for computing the minimal regret against any strategy by reducing from
the problem of determining the antagonistic value of a discounted-sum game. More precisely, from a
weighted arena G we construct, in logarithmic space, a weighted arena G′ such that the antagonistic
value of G is equal to the regret value of G′. This gives us:
Lemma 11. Computing the regret of a discounted-sum game is at least as hard as computing the antag-
onistic value of a (polynomial-size) game with the same payoff function.
Proof of Lemma 11. Suppose G is a weighted arena with initial vertex vI . Consider the weighted arena
G′ obtained by adding to G the gadget of Figure 5 with K := W1−λ . The initial vertex of G
′ is set to be
v′I . We will show that aVal(G) = K + 1−Reg(G
′)/λ.
At v′I Eve has a choice: she can choose to remain in the gadget or she can move to the original game
G. If Eve remains in the gadget her payoff will be λ(−3K − 2) while Adam could choose to enter the
game and achieve a payoff of λ · cVal(G). In this case her regret is λ(cVal(G) + 3K + 2) ≥ λ(2K + 2).
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Otherwise, if she chooses to play into G she can achieve at most λ·aVal(G). The strategy of Adam which
maximizes regret against this choice of Eve is the one which remains in the gadget. The payoff for Adam
is λ(K+1) in this case. Hence, the regret of the game in this scenario is λ(K+1−aVal(G)) ≤ λ(2K+1).
Clearly she will choose to enter the game and Reg(G′) = λ(K + 1− aVal(G)).
B Missing Proofs from Section 4
B.1 Proof of Claim 3
We will now argue that if τ ∈ S∀(G˜) is a winning strategy for Adam in G˜, then for all σ ∈ S∃(G), there
exist tτσ ∈ Σ1∀(G) and sτσ ∈ S∃(G) such that Val(sτσ, tτσ)−Val(σ, tτσ) is at least
λ|V |(|E|+1) min
((u,C),(v,D))∈B˜
τ∈Σ1∀(G⇂C)
{cValu¬v(G× τ) − w(u, v)− λcVal
v(G× τ)}. (7)
The argument is straightforward and based on the bijection between plays from G, which are con-
sistent with positional strategies of Adam, and plays in G˜. Recall that safety games are positionally
determined. That is, either Eve has a positional strategy which allows her to perpetually avoid the
unsafe edges against any strategy for Adam, or Adam has a positional strategy which ensures that—
regardless of the behaviour of Eve—the play eventually traverses some unsafe edge. Thus, since we
assume τ ∈ S∀(G˜) is winning for Adam in G˜ we can assume that τ is in fact a positional strategy for
Adam in G˜. Now consider an arbitrary strategy σ for Eve in G. We note, once more, that τ is a strategy
for Adam in G, not only in G˜. Furthermore, τ is a positional strategy for Adam in G. Conversely, σ is a
valid strategy for Eve in G˜. These facts follow from the definition of E∀(·) and construction G˜. Since τ
is winning for Adam in G˜, the play ˜πστ traverses an unsafe edge. In fact, since τ is positional, the unsafe
edge is necessarily traversed in at most |V |(|E| + 1) steps—that is, at most the length of the longest
simple path in G˜. Let us write (v˜i, v˜i+1) = ((vi, Ci), (vi+1, Ci+1)) for the traversed unsafe edge at step
i ≤ |V |(|E|+ 1). By definition of B˜ we have that there exists tτσ ∈ Σ1∀(G⇂Ci) such that
cValvi¬vi+1(G× tτσ)− w(vi, vi+1)− λcVal
vi(G× tτσ).
We now move from the game G˜ back to the original game G. Henceforth, we consider the play πστ =
v0v1 . . . in G which corresponds to ˜πστ = (v0, C0)(v1, C1) . . . in G˜. It is easy to see that πστ [..i] is
consistent with tτσ. Hence, πσtτσ traverses edge (vi, vi+1) corresponding to bad edge (v˜i, v˜i+1) in G˜.
Finally, by determinacy of discounted-sum games and by virtue of G× tτσ being a finite weighted arena,
we have that there is a strategy sτσ ∈ S∃(G× tτσ) such that Val
vi
G (sτσ, tτσ) = cVal
vi(G× tτσ). It then
follows from the definition of cVal and G× sτσ that Val
vI
G (sτσ, tτσ)−Val
vI
G (σ, tτσ) is at least the value
from Equation (7), just as required.
B.2 Proof of Claim 4
Let us show that if σ ∈ S∃(G˜) is a winning strategy for Eve in G˜, then there is sσ ∈ S∃(G) such that
regsσ
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) = 0. The intuition behind the argument is the same as for the proof of Claim 2. However,
in this case we first need to describe how to construct the strategy for Eve in G from a strategy for her
in G˜.
A regret-free strategy from G˜. Observe that, by construction of G˜, for any vertex (u,C) ∈ Vˆ∃ and
any edge (u, v) ∈ E there is exactly one corresponding edge in G˜: ((u,C), (v, C)). Given a vertex (u,C)
from G˜, denote by [(u,C)]1 the vertex u. Now, given a strategy σ ∈ S∃(G˜) we define sσ ∈ S∃(G) as
follows
sσ(v0v1v2 . . . ) = [σ((v0, C0)(v1, C1 = C0 ∩ E∀(v0v1))(v2, C1 ∩ E∀(v1v2)) . . . )]1
where C0 = E. It follows from the fact that we have a bijective mapping from plays in G˜ to plays in G
which are consistent with positional strategies for Adam, that sσ is a valid strategy for Eve in G when
playing against a positional adversary. Additionally, it is easy to see that sσ can be realized using finite
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memory only. The memory required corresponds to the subsets of E. The current memory element is
determined by the applying the operator E∀(·) to the current play prefix.
Now that we have our strategy sσ for Eve in G, we proceed by proving the analogue of Claim 5 in
this setting.
Claim 6. If σ ∈ S∃(G˜) is a winning strategy for Eve in G˜, then
∀τ ∈ Σ1∀(G), ∀i ≥ 0 : Val(πsστ [i..] = vi . . . ) ≥ cVal
vi(G× τ). (8)
Proof. To convince the reader that sσ has the property from Equation (8), we consider the synchronized
product of G and sσ—that is, the synchronized product of G and the finite Moore machine realizing sσ.
As sσ is a finite memory strategy, then this product, which we denote in the sequel by G× sσ, is finite.
Now, towards a contradiction, suppose that Equation (8) does not hold for sσ. That is, there is some
τ ∈ Σ1∀(G) for which the property fails. Further, let us consider an alternative (memoryless) strategy σ
′
of Eve which ensures cValv(G × τ) from all v ∈ V . The latter exists by definition of cVal(G × τ) and
memoryless determinacy of discounted-sum games (see, e.g. [15]).
Let H denote a copy of G × sσ where all edges induced by E from G are added—not just the ones
allowed by sσ—and H⇂σ
′ denote the sub-graph of H where only edges allowed by σ′ are left. Intuitively,
both G× sσ and H⇂σ′ are sub-structures of G˜ with a weight function w˜ lifted from w to the blown-up
vertex set V˜ . This is due to the way in which we constructed sσ.
Since, by assumption, sσ does not have the property of Equation (8) then the edges present in at
least one vertex from H⇂σ′ and G × σ differ. Note that such a vertex (u,C) is necessarily such that
u ∈ V∃—and C is a “memory element” from the machine realizing sσ corresponding to a subset of E
obtained via E∀(·). Furthermore, from our definition of a strategy, we know that there is a single outgoing
edge from it in both structures. Let us write (u, v)—instead of ((u,C), (v,D))—for the edge in G × sσ
and (u, v′) for the edge in H⇂σ′. Recall that sσ is winning for Eve in G˜. Thus, we have that (u, v) 6∈
B˜ = {((u,C), (v,D)) ∈ Eˆ : u ∈ V∃ and ∃τ ′ ∈ Σ1∀(G⇂C), w(u, v) + λcVal
v(G× τ ′) < cValu¬v(G× τ
′)}. It
follows that
w(u, v) + λcValv(H × τ) ≥ cValv
′
(H × τ).
Thus, the strategy σ′′ of Eve which takes (u, v) instead of (u, v′) and follows σ′ otherwise—indeed, this
might mean σ′′ is no longer memoryless—also achieves at least cValu(H × τ) from u onwards. Notice
that this process can be repeated for all vertices in which the two structures differ. Further, since both
are finite, it will eventually terminate and yield a strategy of Eve which plays exactly as sσ and for
which, since τ was chosen arbitrarily, Equation (8) holds. Contradiction.
It follows immediately that regsσ
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) = 0. Indeed, if we suppose that this is not the case, then
there exists a strategy σ′ ∈ S∃(G) such that
∃τ ∈ Σ1∀(G) : Val(sσ, τ) < Val(σ
′, τ).
The above directly contradicts Claim 6.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
In this section we present sufficient modifications to our definitions from Section 3 in order for the
techniques used therein to be adapted for this case. Particularly, our notion of regret of a play and
the safety game used to decide the existence of regret-free strategies need to take into account the fact
that witnessing edges taken by Adam affects previously observed local regrets. That is, we formalize
the intuition that alternative plays must also be consistent with the behaviour of Adam that we have
witnessed in the current play.
We are now ready to define the regret of a play in a game against a positional adversary. Given a
play π = v0v1 . . . , we let
reg(π) := sup{λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(π)) −Val(π[i..]) : vi ∈ V∃} ∪ {0}.
Consider now a play prefix ρ = v0 . . . vj . We let the regret of ρ be
max{λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(ρ[i..j]))−Val(ρ[i..j]) : 0 ≤ i < j and vi ∈ V∃} ∪ {0}.
We will now re-prove Lemma 6 in the current setting.
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Lemma 12. For any strategy σ of Eve,
regσ
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) = sup{reg(π) : π is consistent with σ and some τ ∈ Σ1∀}.
Proof. Consider any σ, σ′ ∈ S∃ and τ ∈ Σ1∀ such that πστ 6= πσ′τ . Let us write πστ = v0v1 . . . and
πσ′τ = v
′
0v
′
1 . . . and denote by ℓ the length of the longest common prefix of πστ and πσ′τ . We claim that
λℓ
(
cValvℓ¬vℓ+1(G⇂E∀(πστ ))−Val(πστ )[ℓ..]
)
≥ λℓ
(
Val(πσ′τ [ℓ..])−Val(πστ [ℓ..])
)
. (9)
Indeed, if we assume it is not the case, we then get that
cValv
′
ℓ+1(G⇂E∀(πστ )) < Val(πσ′τ [ℓ+ 1..]).
However, recall that G× τ is a sub-arena of G⇂E∀(πστ ). Thus, the co-operative value Eve can obtain in
the former, say by playing σ′, must be at most that which she can obtain in the latter. Contradiction.
Note that there is another positional strategy τ ′ for Adam and a second alternative strategy σ′′ for Eve
which do give us equality for Equation (9). For this purpose, we choose τ ′ so that τ ′ ∈ Σ1∀(G⇂E∀(πστ ))—
so that πστ is also consistent with τ
′, thus E∀(πστ ) = E∀(πστ ′) (see Lemma 9)—and also such that
cVal
v′ℓ+1(G× τ ′) = cValv
′
ℓ+1(G⇂E∀(πστ )).
We choose σ′′ so that it follows σ for ℓ turns, goes to v′, and then plays co-operatively with τ ′ from v′.
More formally, let σ′′ be a strategy for Eve such that πστ [..ℓ] = πσ′′τ [..ℓ] and therefore, by choice of τ
′,
such that πστ ′ [..ℓ] = πσ′′τ ′ [..ℓ] and so that
Val(πσ′′τ ′ [ℓ..]) = cVal
v′ℓ+1(G× τ ′).
It follows from Equation (9) and the above arguments that for all σ ∈ S∃, if there are τ ∈ Σ
1
∀ and
σ′ ∈ S∃ such that πστ 6= πσ′τ then
sup
τ,σ′:πστ 6=πσ′τ
λℓ
(
Val(πσ′τ [ℓ..])−Val(πστ [ℓ..])
)
= λℓ
(
cValvℓ¬vℓ+1(G⇂E∀(πστ ))−Val(πστ )
)
. (10)
We are now able to prove the result. That is, for any strategy σ for Eve:
sup{reg(π) : π is consistent with σ and some τ ∈ Σ1∀}
= sup
τ∈Σ1
∀
reg(πστ = v0v1 . . . ) def. of πστ
= sup
τ∈Σ1∀
max

0, supi≥0
vi∈V∃
λi
(
cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(πστ ))−Val(πστ [i..])
)
 def. of reg(πστ )
= sup
τ∈Σ1∀
max
{
0, sup
σ′:πστ 6=πσ′τ
λℓ (Val(πσ′τ [ℓ..])−Val(πστ [ℓ..]))
}
by Eq. (10)
= sup
τ∈Σ1∀
max
{
0, sup
σ′:πστ 6=πσ′τ
(Val(σ′, τ) −Val(σ, τ))
}
def. of Val(·), ℓ
= sup
τ∈Σ1∀
sup
σ′∈S∃
(Val(σ′, τ) −Val(σ, τ)) 0 when πστ = πσ′τ
as required.
We will now state and prove a restricted version of Lemma 7. Intuitively, for a play π, we will not be
able to consider a deviation with respect to a prefix of π. Rather, we are forced to take the co-operative
value with respect to the set E∀(π)—that is, the edges consistent with any positional strategy Adam
might be playing—even after the bound on where the best deviation occurs.
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vI
vj
π π′
vi′
cValvi′¬vi′+1(G⇂E∀(π))
vi
cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(π
′))
N(bG)
Figure 6: Let ρ denote the play prefix v0 . . . vj . The alternative play from vi′ is better than the one from
vi w.r.t ρ. However, for play π
′ extending ρ, the alternative play from vi becomes better than the one
from vi′ if λ
i′−icValvi′¬vi′+1(G⇂E∀(π
′)) is smaller than cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(π
′))−Val(ρ[i..i′]).
Lemma 13. Let π be a play in G and suppose 0 < r ≤ reg(π). Let
N(r) := ⌊(log r + log(1− λ) − log(2W ))/ logλ⌋+ 1.
Then reg(π) is equal to
max
0≤i<N(r)
vi∈V∃
{λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(π)) −Val(π[i..N(r)])} − λ
N(r)Val(π[N(r)..]).
Proof. Observe thatN(r) is such that 2Wλ
N(r)
1−λ < r. Hence, we have that for all i ≥ N(r) such that vi ∈ V∃
it holds that λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G)−Val(π[i..])) ≤
2WλN(r)
1−λ < r. Clearly, since cVal
vi
¬vi+1(H) ≤ cVal
vi
¬vi+1(G)
holds for any sub-arena H of G, we have that
λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(π)) −Val(π[i..])) ≤
2WλN(r)
1− λ
< r.
It thus follows that
reg(π) = sup{λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(π)) −Val(π[i..])) : i ≥ 0 and vi ∈ V∃}
= max
0≤i<N(r)
vi∈V∃
λi
(
cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(π)) −Val(π[i..N(r)])
)
− λN(r)Val(π[N(r)..])
as required.
The main difference between the problem at hand and the one we solved in Section 3 is that, when
playing against a positional adversary, information revealed to Eve in the present can affect the best
alternatives to her current behaviour. Some definitions are in order. Let ρ = v0 . . . vj be a play prefix.
The maximal-regret points of ρ, denoted by MRP(ρ), is the set
{0 ≤ i < j : vi ∈ V∃ and λ
i
(
cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(ρ[..j])) −Val(ρ[i..j])
)
= reg(ρ)};
and the maximal-regret strategies of ρ, written MRS(ρ), is equal to
τ ∈ Σ1∀(G⇂E∀(ρ[..j])) :
∨
i∈MRP(ρ)
cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(ρ[..j])) = cVal
vi
¬vi+1(G× τ)

 .
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vI
vj
π π′
vi′
cValvi′¬vi′+1(G⇂E∀(ρ))
vi
cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(π
′))
N(bG)
ν(bG)
Figure 7: A play π′ extending ρ in a way such that Σ1∀(G⇂E∀(π
′)) ∩MRS(ρ) = ∅ cannot have more
regret than a play π extending ρ for which Σ1∀(G⇂E∀(π)) ∩MRS(ρ) 6= ∅—for ρ longer than ν(bG).
The above definitions are meant to capture the intuition that, upon witnessing a new choice of Adam, we
can reduce the size of the set of possible positional strategies he could be using. Consider a play prefix
ρ. The maximal-regret points of ρ correspond to the positions at which best alternatives to ρ occur.
The maximal-regret strategies of ρ is the set of positional strategies of Adam, ρ consistent with them,
such that at least one of the best alternatives to ρ is consistent with them. Recall from Lemma 9 (ii)
that a play prefix ρ is consistent with a positional strategy τ ∈ Σ1∀(G) if and only if τ ∈ Σ
1
∀(G⇂E∀(ρ)).
We can, therefore, think of the set of edges E∀(ρ) as representing the set of all positional strategies for
Adam in G that ρ is consistent with, i.e. {τ ∈ Σ1∀(G) : ρ is consistent with τ}. Let us write Σ
1
∀(G, ρ) for
the set we just described. Let β be the value of one of the best alternatives to ρ. If β′ < β is the value
of one of the best alternatives to ρ′, then we know the best alternatives to ρ are not consistent with any
strategy from Σ1∀(G, ρ
′). Then, according to our definition of maximal-regret strategies, this also means
that MRS(ρ) ∩ Σ1∀(G, ρ
′) = ∅. The converse is also true.
As an example, consider the situation depicted in Figure 6. If, from vj , the play π
′ is obtained and
we have that Σ1∀(G⇂E∀(π
′) ∩MRS(ρ) is empty, then the deviation from vi′ might no longer be a best
alternative. Indeed, there is no positional strategy of Adam which allows the deviation from vi′ to obtain
the value we assumed (from just looking at the prefix ρ) and which is also consistent with π′. In order
to deal with this, we need some more definitions.
Assume that Reg
S∃,Σ1∀
(G) ≥ bG. For a play prefix ρ = v0 . . . vn with n ≥ N(bG), let us define the
value δρ (δ for drop) as
min
0≤i≤j<N(bG)
τ,τ ′∈Σ1∀(G⇂E∀(ρ))
∣∣∣λi (cValvi¬vi+1(G× τ) −Val(ρ[i..j]))− λjcValvj¬vj+1(G× τ ′))∣∣∣ .
Intuitively δρ is the minimal drop of the regret achievable by a better alternative (given the information
we can extract from ρ).
The smallest possible drop. Let us derive a universal lower bound on δρ for all ρ of length at least
N(bG). In order to do so we will recall “the shape” of the co-operative value of G. Recall the cVal
in a discounted-sum game can be obtained by supposing Eve controls all vertices and computing aVal
instead. It then follows from positional determinacy of discounted-sum games that the cVal is achieved
by a lasso in the arena G. More formally, we know that there is a play π in G of the form
π = v0 . . . vk−1(vk . . . vℓ)
ω
where 0 ≤ k < ℓ ≤ |V |, and such that Val(π) = cValv0(G). Let us write λ = α
β
with α, β ∈ Z. One can
then verify that
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Lemma 14. For all sub-arenas H of G, for all vertices v ∈ V , there exists N ∈ Z such that cValv(H) =
N
D
where D := β|V |(β|V | − α|V |).
It then follows from the definition of δρ that:
Lemma 15. For all play prefixes ρ = v0 . . . vn such that n ≥ N(bG) we have that
δρ >
1
βN(bG)D
.
Formalizing our claims. We can now prove a replacement for Lemma 7 holds in this context.
Lemma 16. Let π be a play in G and assume RegS∃,Σ1∀(G) > 0. Let ν(bG) denote the value
N(bG) +
⌊
log(1− λ) − logW − (N(bG) + |V |) log β − log(β|V | − α|V |)
logλ
⌋
+ 1.
Then for all σ ∈ S∃,
sup
τ∈Σ1
∀
reg(πστ ) = sup
τ∈Σ1
∀
reg(πστ [..ν(bG)])− λ
ν(bG)Val(πστ [ν(bG)..]).
Proof. Let us consider throughout this argument an arbitrary σ ∈ S∃. From Lemma 13 and the fact
that ν(bG) is such that N(bG), we know that supτ∈Σ1
∀
reg(πστ = v0 . . . ) equals
sup
τ∈Σ1∀
max
0≤i<ν(bG)
vi∈V∃
{λi(cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(πστ ))−Val(πστ [i..ν(bG)])} − λ
ν(bG)Val(πστ [ν(bG)..]).
Now, also note that ν(bG) was chosen so that
Wλν(bG)
1− λ
<
1
βN(bG)+|V |D
.
Hence, for all τ ′ ∈ Σ1∀ if we write πστ ′ = v
′
0 . . . , then for all j ≥ ν(bG) such that v
′
j ∈ V∃ it holds that
−
1
βN(bG)+|V |D
< λiVal(πστ ′ [i..])) <
1
βN(bG)+|V |D
.
It then follows from Lemma 15 and the definition of δπ
στ′
[..ν(bG)] that, if there exists ℓ ≥ ν(bG) such that
for all 0 ≤ k ≤ ν(bG) with v′k ∈ V∃
cVal
v′k
¬v′
k+1
(G⇂E∀(π[..ℓ])) < cVal
v′k
¬v′
k+1
(G⇂E∀(π[..ν(bG)]))
then reg(πστ ′) < reg(πστ ′′) for all τ
′′ ∈MRS(π′[..ν(bG)]). This is due to the fact that that πστ ′′ [..ν(bG)] =
πστ ′ [..ν(bG)] and
cVal
v′k
¬v′
k+1
(G× τ ′′) = cVal
v′k
¬v′
k+1
(G⇂E∀(πστ ′′ [..ν(bG)])).
The above implies that for all σ ∈ S∀ the value supτ∈Σ1∀ reg(πστ = v0 . . . ) equals
max{cValvi¬vi+1(G⇂E∀(πστ [..ν(bG)])) − λ
ν(bG)Val(πστ [..ν(bG)]) : 0 ≤ i ≤ N(bG) and vi ∈ V∃}
and therefore (by definition of regret of a prefix) we have that
sup
τ∈Σ1∀
reg(πστ ) = sup
τ∈Σ1∀
reg(πστ [..ν(bG)])− λ
ν(bG)Val(πστ [ν(bG)..]).
as required.
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Putting everything together. Let us go back to our example to illustrate how to use ν(bG) and the
drop of a prefix. Consider now the situation from Figure 7. Recall we have assumed π′ is a play extending
ρ with Σ1∀(G⇂E∀(π
′)) ∩MRS(ρ) = ∅. It follows that all best alternatives to π′ achieve a payoff strictly
smaller than cValv
′
¬vi′+1
(G⇂E∀(ρ)). Thus, the regret of π
′ can only be bigger than the regret of a play π
with Σ1∀(G⇂E∀(π))∩MRS(ρ) 6= ∅ if the minimal index k > j such that Σ
1
∀(G⇂E∀(π
′[..j]))∩MRS(ρ) = ∅—
i.e. the turn at which Adam revealed he was not playing a strategy from MRS(ρ)—is small enough. In
other words, the drop in the value of the best alternative has to be compensated by a similar drop in
the value obtained by Eve, and the discount factor makes this impossible after some number of turns.
Proposition 3. If RegS∃,Σ1∀(G) ≥ bG then RegS∃,Σ1∀(G) is equal to
inf
σ∈S∃
sup{reg(π[..ν(bG)])− λ
ν(bG)aValuˆ(Hˆ) : π = v0v1 . . . cons. with σ and some τ ∈ Σ
1
∀}
where
• uˆ := (vν(bG), E∀(π[..ν(bG)])) and
• Hˆ := Gˆ⇂{((C, u), (D, v)) : Σ1∀(G⇂D) ∩MRS(π[..ν(bG)]) 6= ∅}.
Proof. First, note that if RegS∃,Σ1∀(G) > 0 then there cannot be any regret-free strategies for Eve in G
when playing against a positional adversary. It then follows from Corollary 3 that RegS∃,Σ1∀(G) ≥ bG.
Now using Lemma 16 together with the definition of the regret of a play we get that RegS∃,Σ1∀(G)
is equal to
inf
σ∈S∃
sup{reg(π[..ν(bG)])− λ
ν(bG)Val(π[ν(bG)..]) : π cons. σ and some τ ∈ Σ
1
∀}.
Finally, note that it is in the interest of Eve to maximize the value λν(bG)Val(π[ν(bG)..]) in order to min-
imize regret. Conversely, Adam tries to minimize the same value with a strategy from MRS(π[..ν(bG)]):
critically, the strategy is such that the prefix π[..ν(bG)] is consistent with it. Thus, we can replace it
by the antagonistic value from π[ν(bG)..] discounted accordingly. In this setting we also want to force
Adam to play a positional strategy which is consistent with deviations before N(bG) which achieve the
assumed regret of the prefix π[..ν(bG)]. More formally, we have
inf
σ∈S∃
sup
τ∈Σ1∀
reg(πστ [..ν(bG)])− λ
ν(bG)Val(πστ [ν(bG)..])
= inf
σ∈S∃
σ′∈S∃
sup
τ∈Σ1∀
τ ′∈MRS(πστ [..ν(bG)])
reg(πστ [..ν(bG)])− λ
ν(bG)Val(σ′, τ ′)
= inf
σ∈S∃
sup
τ∈S∀
reg(πστ [..ν(bG)]) + inf
σ′∈S∃
sup
τ ′∈MRS(πστ [..ν(bG)])
(
−λν(bG)Val(σ′, τ ′)
)
.
It should be clear that the RHS term of the sum is equivalent to
−λν(bG)aValuˆ(Hˆ)
as required.
The above result allows us to claim an EXPSPACE algorithm (when λ is not fixed) to compute the
regret of a game. As in Section 3, we simulate the game using an alternating machine which halts in at
most a pseudo-polynomial number of steps which depends on ν(bG) and, in turn, on bG. After that, we
must compute the antagonistic value of Gˆ. As a first step, however, we compute the safety game G˜ and
determine its winner.
Proposition 4. Computing the regret value of a game, playing against a positional adversary, can be
done in time O(max{|V |(|E|+ 1), ν(bG)}) with an alternating Turing machine.
The memory requirements for Eve are as follows:
Corollary 5. Let η := |∆|d where d = max{|V |(|E| + 1), ν(bG)}. It then holds that RegΣη∃,Σ1∀(G) =
RegS∃,Σ1∀
(G).
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x0
x0
x1
x1
. . .
xm
xm
Φ
Ci
. . .
Cj
A
Figure 8: Depiction of the reduction from QBF.
xi
xjxk
C
C
CC
C
C
B
Figure 9: Clause gadget for the QBF reduction for clause xi ∨ ¬xj ∨ xk.
B.4 Lower bounds
In the main body of the paper, namely in Section 4, we have claimed that the regret threshold problem
is coNP-hard when λ is fixed. The proof of this claim is provided in Appendix B.4.2. In the next section
we shall prove the following result which applies for when λ is not fixed.
Lemma 17. For a discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1), regret threshold r ∈ Q, and weighted arena G, determining
whether RegS∃,Σ1∀(G)⊳ r, for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}, is PSPACE-hard.
B.4.1 Proof of Lemma 17
The QSAT Problem asks whether a given fully quantified boolean formula (QBF) is satisfiable. The
problem is known to be PSPACE-complete [10]. It is known the result holds even if the formula is assumed
to be in conjunctive normal form with three literals per clause (also known as 3-CNF). Therefore, w.l.o.g.,
we consider an instance of the QSAT Problem to be given in the following form:
∃x0∀x1∃x2 . . .Φ(x0, x1, . . . , xm)
where Φ is in 3-CNF. Let n be the number of clauses from Φ.
In the sequel we describe how to construct, in polynomial time, a weighted arena in which Eve ensures
regret of at most r if and only if the QBF is true.
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We first describe the value-choosing part of the game (see Figure 8). V∃ contains vertices for every
existentially quantified variable from the QBF and V \V∃ contains vertices for every universally quantified
variable. At each of this vertices, there are two outgoing edges with weight 0 corresponding to a choice
of truth value for the variable. For the variable xi vertex, the true edge leads to a vertex from which
Eve can choose to move to any of the clause gadgets corresponding to clauses where the literal xi occurs
(see dotted incoming edge in Figure 9) or to advance to xi+1. The false edge construction is similar.
From the vertices encoding the choice of truth value for xm Eve can either visit the clause gadgets for it
or move to a “final” vertex Φ ∈ V∃. This final vertex has a self-loop with weight A.
Our reduction works for values of λ, r, A, B, and C such that the following constraints are met:
(i) A < B < C,
(ii) λ2
(
C
1−λ
)
− λ2nm−2
(
C + λ2 B1−λ
)
< r,
(iii) λ2nm−2
(
C + λ2 B1−λ
)
> λ2
(
C 1−λ
4
1−λ
1−λ8
)
,
(iv) λ2
(
C + λ2 B1−λ
)
− λ2nm
(
A
1−λ
)
< r, and
(v) λ2nm−2
(
C
1−λ
)
− λ2nm
(
A
1−λ
)
≥ r.
(See below for a sample concrete assignment.)
Value-choosing strategies. To conclude the proof, we describe the strategy of Eve which ensures the
desired property if the QBF is satisfiable and a strategy of Adam which ensures the property is falsified
otherwise.
Assume the QBF is true. It follows that there is a strategy of the existential player in the QBF game
such that for any strategy of the universal player the QBF will be true after they both choose values for
the variables. Eve now follows this strategy while visiting all clause gadgets corresponding to occurrences
of chosen literals. At every gadget clause she visits she chooses to enter the gadget. If Adam now decides
to take the weight C edge, Eve can go to the center-most vertex and obtain a payoff of at least
λ2nm−2
(
C + λ2
B
1− λ
)
,
with equality holding if Adam helps her at the very last clause visit of the very last variable gadget. In
this case, the claim holds by (i). We therefore focus in the case where Adam chooses to take Eve back
to the vertex from which she entered the gadget. She can now go to the next clause gadget and repeat.
Thus, when the play reaches vertex Φ, Eve must have visited every clause gadget and Adam has chosen
to disallow a weight C edge in every gadget. Now Eve can ensure a payoff value of λ2nm( A1−λ) by going
to Φ. As she has witnessed that in every clause gadget there is at least one vertex in which Adam is not
helping her, alternative strategies might have ensured a payoff of at most λ2(C + λ2 B1−λ), by playing to
the center of some clause gadget, or
λ2
(
C 1−λ
4
1−λ
1− λ8
)
by playing in and out of some adjacent clause gadgets. By (iii), we know it suffices to show that the
former is still not enough to make the regret of Eve at least r. Thus, from (iv), we get that her regret
is less than r.
Conversely, if the universal player had a winning strategy (or, in other words, the QBF was not
satisfiable) then the strategy of Adam consists in following this strategy in choosing values for the
variables and taking Eve out of clause gadgets if she ever enters one. If the play arrives at Φ we have
that there is at least one clause gadget that was not visited by the play. We note there is an alternative
strategy of Eve which, by choosing a different valuation of some variable, reaches this clause gadget and
with the help of Adam achieves value of at least λ2nm−2( C1−λ). Hence, by (v), this strategy of Adam
ensures regret of at least r. If Eve avoids reaching Φ then she can ensure a value of at most 0, which
means an even greater regret for her.
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v t1
s2
Figure 10: Regret gadget for 2-disjoint-paths reduction.
Example assignment. For completeness, we give one assignment of the positive rationals λ, r, A,
B, and C which satisfies the inequalities. It will be obvious the chosen values can be encoded into a
polynomial number of bits w.r.t. n and m.
We can assume, w.l.o.g., that 2 ≤ 2m ≤ n. Intuitively, we want values such that (i) A < B < C and
such that the discount factor λ is close enough to 1 so that going to the center of a clause gadget at the
end of the value-choosing rounds, is preferable for Adam compared to doing some strange path between
adjacent clauses—this is captured by item (iii). A λ which is close to 1 also gives us item (v) from (i).
In order to ensure Eve wins if she does visit the center of a clause gadget, we also would like to have
C − A < rλ−2(1 − λ), which would imply items (ii) and (iv) from the inequality list. It is not hard to
see that the following assignment satisfies all the inequalities:
• λ := 1− 1
2n3
,
• A := 2,
• B := 3,
• C := 4, and
• r := 3(2n
6
− 1).
B.4.2 Proof of Theorem 5
The 2-disjoint-paths Problem on directed graphs is known to be NP-complete [8]. We sketch how to
translate a given instance of the 2-disjoint-paths Problem into a weighted arena in which Eve can
ensure regret value of 0 if, and only if, the answer to the 2-disjoint-paths Problem is negative.
Consider a directed graph G and distinct vertex pairs (s1, t1) and (s2, t2). W.l.o.g. we assume that
for all i ∈ {1, 2}: (i) si 6= ti, (ii) ti is reachable from si, and (iii) ti is a sink (i.e. has no outgoing edges).
in G. We now describe the changes we apply to G in order to get the underlying graph structure of the
weighted arena and then comment on the weight function. Let all vertices from G be Adam vertices
and s1 be the initial vertex. We replace all edges (v, t1) incident on t1 by a copy of the gadget shown in
Figure 10. Next, we add self-loops on t1 and t2 with weights A and B, respectively. Finally, the weights
of all remaining edges are 0. Our reduction works for any value of A and B such that
(i) λ|V | A1−λ > r, and
(ii) λ|V | B1−λ − λ
A
1−λ > r.
For instance, consider α := r+1
λ|V |
. It is easy to verify that setting A := (1 − λ)α and B := (1 − λ)α2
satisfies the inequalities. Furthermore, A and B are rational numbers which can be represented using a
polynomial number of bits w.r.t. |V | and the size of the representation of both λ and r.
We claim that, in this new weighted arena, Eve can ensure a regret value of 0 if in G the vertex pairs
(s1, t1) and (s2, t2) cannot be joined by vertex-disjoint paths. If, on the contrary, there are vertex-disjoint
paths joining the pairs of vertices, then Adam can ensure a regret value strictly greater than r. Indeed,
we claim that the strategy that minimizes the regret of Eve is the strategy that, in states where Eve has
a choice, tells her to go to t1.
First, let us prove that this strategy has regret 0 if, and only if, there are no two paths disjoint paths
in the graph between the pairs of states (s1, t1), (s2, t2). Assume there are no disjoint paths, then if
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Adam chooses to always avoid t1 then the regret is 0. If t1 is reached, then the choice of Eve ensures a
value of at least λ|V | A1−λ . The only alternative strategy of Eve is to have chosen to go to s2. As there
are no disjoint paths, we know that either the path constructed from s2 by Adam never reaches t2, and
then the value of the path is 0 and the regret is 0 for Eve or the path constructed from s2 reaches t1
again, and so the regret is also equal to 0 since the discount factor ensures the value of this play is lower
than the one realized by the current strategy of Eve. Now assume that there are disjoint paths, if Eve
would have chosen to put the game in s2 (instead of choosing t1) then Adam has a strategy which allows
Eve to reach t2 and get a payoff of at least λ
|V | B
1−λ while she achieves at most λ
A
1−λ . From (i) we have
that the regret in this case is greater than r.
To conclude the proof, let us show that any other strategy of Eve has a regret greater than 0. Indeed,
if Eve decides to go to s2 (instead of choosing to go to t1) then Adam can choose to loop on s2 and the
payoff in this case is 0. The regret of Eve is non-zero in this case since she could have achieved at least
λ|V | A1−λ by going to t1. It follows from (ii) that this ensures a regret value greater than r.
C Missing Proofs From Section 5
C.1 Proof of Theorem 8
We reduce the problem to determining the winner of a reachability game on an exponentially larger
arena. Although the arena is exponentially larger, all paths are only polynomial in length, so the winner
can be determined in alternating polynomial time, or equivalently, polynomial space.
The idea of the construction is as follows. Given a discounted-sum automaton A, we determinize its
transitions via a subset construction, to obtain a deterministic, multi-valued discounted-sum automaton
DA. Then we decide if Eve is able to simulate, within the regret bound, the DA on A for all finite words
up to a length (polynomially) dependent on ε. If we simulate the automaton for a sufficient number of
steps, then any significant gap between the automata will be unrecoverable regardless of future inputs,
and we can give a satisfactory answer for the ε-gap regret problem.
More formally, given a discounted-sum automatonA = (Q, q0, A, δ, w), a regret value r and a precision
ε > 0, we construct a reachability game GεA(r) as follows. Let
N :=
⌊
logλ
(
ε(1− λ)
4W
)⌋
+ 1,
where W is the maximum absolute value weight occurring in A, so that λ
N ·W
1−λ <
ε
4 . Let P = {DSλ(π) :
π ∈ Q∗ is a finite run of A with |π| ≤ N} denote the (finite) set of possible discounted payoffs of words
of length at most N . Let F be the set of functions f : Q → R ∪ {⊥}, and for f ∈ F , let supp(f) =
{q ∈ Q : f(q) 6= ⊥}. Intuitively, each f ∈ F represents a weighted subset of Q (supp(f) being the
corresponding unweighted subset), where f(q) for q ∈ supp(f) corresponds to the maximal weight over
all (consistent) paths ending in q (scaled by a power of λ). Given f ∈ F and α ∈ A the α-successor of f
is the function fα defined as:
fα(q
′) :=


max
q∈supp(f)
(q,α,q′)∈δ
{λ−1 · f(q) + w(q, α, q′)} if this set is not empty
⊥ otherwise.
We define F0 = {f0} where f0(q0) = 0 and f0(q) = ⊥ for all q 6= q0; and for all n ≥ 0, we define
Fn+1 := {fα : f ∈ F and α ∈ A}. For convenience, let F =
⋃N
i=0Fi (considered as a disjoint union).
The game GεA(r) = (V, V∃, E, v0, T ) is defined as follows:
• V = (Q× F × P ) ∪ (Q × F × P ×A);
• V∃ = (Q × F × P × A);
•
(
(q, f, c), (q, f, c, α)
)
∈ E for all q ∈ Q, f ∈ F \ FN , c ∈ P , and α ∈ A;
•
(
(q, f, c, α), (q′, f ′, c′)
)
∈ E for all q, q′ ∈ Q, f ∈ F \ FN , c ∈ P , and α ∈ A such that (q, α, q′) ∈ δ,
f ′ = fα, and c
′ = c+ λ · w(q, α, q′);
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• v0 = (q0, f0, 0); and
• (q, f, c) ∈ T if, and only if, f ∈ FN and maxs∈supp(f) λ
N−1 · f(s) ≤ c+ r + ε2 .
We claim that determining the winner of GεA(r) yields a correct response for the ε-gap promise
problem.
Claim 7. Let GεA(r) be defined as above. Then:
• If Eve wins GεA(r) then RegΣ∃,W∀(A) ≤ r + ε, and
• if Adam wins GεA(r) then RegΣ∃,W∀(A) > r.
Proof of Claim 7. It is easy to see that a play of GεA(r) results in Adam choosing a word w ∈ A
∗ of
length N , and Eve selecting a run, π, of w on A by resolving non-determinism at each symbol. Further,
if the play terminates at (q, f, c) then c = DSλ(π) and, as f contains the maximal weights of all paths
(scaled by a power of λ), A(w) = λN−1(maxs∈supp(f) f(s)). Since |w| = N we have, for any infinite
word w′ ∈ Aω and for any run, π′, of A on w′ from q, π′:
|A(w · w′)−A(w)| ≤
λN ·W
1− λ
<
ε
4
, and
|DSλ(π · π
′)− DSλ(π)| ≤
λN ·W
1− λ
<
ε
4
.
It follows that:
(A(w) − DSλ(π))−
ε
2
< A(w · w′)− DSλ(π · π
′) < (A(w) − DSλ(π)) +
ε
2
. (11)
Now suppose Eve wins GεA(r). Then, for every word w with |w| = N , Eve has a strategy σ that
construct a run, π, on A such that A(w) ≤ DSλ(π) + r +
ε
2 . We extend this strategy to infinite words
by playing arbitrarily after the first N symbols. It follows from Equation 11 that for every infinite word
wˆ, the resulting run, πˆ,
A(wˆ)− DSλ(πˆ) < (A(w) − DSλ(π)) +
ε
2
≤ r + ε.
Since regσA(Σ∃,W∀) = supwˆ∈Aω (A(wˆ)− DSλ(π)), we have RegΣ∃,W∀(A) ≤ r + ε.
Conversely, suppose Adam wins GεA(r). Then for any strategy of Eve, Adam can construct a word w,
with |w| = N such that the run, π, ofA on w determined by Eve’s strategy satisfiesA(w) > DSλ(π)+r+
ε
2 .
Again, from Equation 11 it follows that for any infinite word wˆ with w as its prefix and any consistent
run π′,
A(wˆ)− DSλ(πˆ) > (A(w) − DSλ(π)) −
ε
2
> r.
As this is valid for any strategy of Eve, we have RegΣ∃,W∀(A) > r as required.
Now every path in GεA(r) has length at most N , and as the set of successors of a given state can be
computed on-the-fly in polynomial time, the winner can be determined in alternating polynomial time.
Hence a solution to the ε-gap promise problem is constructible in polynomial space.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 9
Given an instance of the QSAT Problem – a fully quantified boolean formula (QBF) – we construct,
in polynomial time, a weighted arena such that the answer to the regret threshold problem is positive
if, and only if, the QBF is true. The main idea behind our reduction is to build an arena with two
disconnected sub-graphs joined by an initial gadget in which we force Eve to go into a specific sub-arena.
In order for her to ensure the regret is not too high she must now make sure all alternative plays in the
other part of the arena do not achieve too high values. In the sub-arena where Eve finds herself, we will
simulate the choice of values for the boolean variables from the QBF while in the other sub-arena these
choices will affect which alternative paths can achieve high discounted-sum values based on the clauses
of the QBF. We describe the reduction for ≤. It will be clear how to extend the result to <.
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⊥0 ⊥Z
A, 0 A,Z
A, 0bail, 0 A, 0 bail, 0
A \ {bail}, 0 A \ {bail}, 0
Figure 11: Initial gadget used in reduction from QBF.
. . .
⊥0 ⊥Z
xn
x1
. . .
⊥X ⊥Y
xk
xj xj
A, 0
¬b, 0
A \ ¬b, 0
A, 0
b, 0
A \ b, 0
A, 0 A, 0
¬b, 0
A \ ¬b, 0
b, 0
A \ b, 0
A, 0
¬b, 0
b, 0
A \ {b,¬b}, 0
Figure 12: Left and right sub-arenas of the reduction from QBF. Clause i shown on the left; existential
and universal gadgets for variables xj and xk, respectively, on the right.
30
The QSAT Problem asks whether a given fully quantified boolean formula (QBF) is satisfiable.
The problem is known to be PSPACE-complete [10]. It is known the result holds even if the formula
is assumed to be in conjunctive normal form with three literals per clause (also known as 3-CNF).
Therefore, w.l.o.g., we consider an instance of the QSAT Problem to be given in the following form:
∃x0∀x1∃x2 . . .Φ(x0, x1, . . . , xn)
where Φ is in 3-CNF.
We now give the details of the construction. Our reduction works for values of positive rationals r,
X , Y , and Z such that
(i) λ2 Z1−λ > r + ε,
(ii) λ2n Z1−λ − λ
2n X
1−λ > r + ε,
(iii) λ2n Z1−λ − λ
2n Y
1−λ ≤ r,
(iv) λ3 Y1−λ − λ
2n X
1−λ ≤ r.
The alphabet of the new weighted arena is A = {bail, b,¬b}.
Example assignment. In order to convince the reader that values which satisfy the above inequalities
indeed exist for all possible valuations of n and ε we give such a valuation. Let f : Q→ Q be defined as
f(x) := (1−λ)x
λ2n
. Note that, w.l.o.g., we can assume that n ≥ 2. Consider the valuation
• r := λ3−2n(1 + ε),
• Z := f(r + ε+ 2),
• X := f(1),
• Y := f(2 + ε).
Clearly, inequalities (i)–(iii) hold. Regarding (iv), it will be useful to consider the equivalent inequality
λ3−2nY −X ≤
r(1 − λ)
λ2n
.
We observe that the LHS is smaller than λ3−2n(Y −X). Furthermore the difference Y −X is equivalent
to (1+ε)(1−λ)
λ2n
. Finally, by choice of r we have that the RHS is equivalent to
λ3−2n
(
(1 + ε)(1− λ)
λ2n
)
.
Hence, (iv) holds as well. Note that the chosen values can be encoded into a polynomial number of bits
w.r.t. λ and n as well as the size of the representation of ε.
Initial gadget. The weighted arena we construct starts as is shown in Figure 11. Here, Eve has a to
make a choice: she can go left or right. If she goes left, then Adam can play bail and force her into ⊥0
giving her a value of 0 while an alternative play goes into ⊥Z achieving a value of λ
2 Z
1−λ . By (i) we get
that the regret of this strategy is greater than r + ε. Thus, we can assume that Eve will always play to
the right.
Choosing values. For each existentially quantified variable xi we will create a “diamond gadget”
to allow Eve to choose a different state depending on the value she wants to assign to xi. From the
corresponding states, Adam will have to play b or ¬b, respectively, otherwise he allows her to get to ⊥Y .
For universally quantified variables we have a 2-transition path which allows Adam to choose b or ¬b (in
the second step). The right path shown in Figure 12 depicts this construction. From (iii) it follows that
if Adam cheats at any point during this simulation of value choosing phase of the QSAT game, then the
play reaches ⊥Y and the regret is at most r. Hence, we can assume that Adam does not cheat and the
play eventually reaches ⊥X . Observe that the choice of values in this gadget is made as follows: at turn
2i after having entered the gadget, the value of xi is decided.
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Clause gadgets. For every clause from Φ we create a path in the new weighted arena such that
every literal ℓi in the clause is synchronized with the turn at which the value of xi is decided in the
value-choosing gadget. That is to say, there are 2i− 1 states that must be visited before arriving at the
state corresponding to ℓi. At state ℓi, if the value of xi corresponding to literal ℓi is chosen, the play
deterministically goes to ⊥0. Otherwise, traversal of the clause-path continues.
It should be clear that if the QBF is true, then Eve has a value-choosing strategy such that at least
one literal from every clause holds. That means that every alternative play in the left sub-arena of
our construction has been forced into ⊥0 while Eve has ensured a discounted-sum value of λ2n
X
1−λ by
reaching ⊥X . From (iv) it follows that Eve has ensured a regret of at most r. Conversely, if Adam has
a value-choosing strategy in the QSAT problem so the QBF is show to be false, then he can use his
strategy in the constructed arena so that some alternative path in the left sub-arena eventually reaches
⊥Z . In this case, from (ii) we get that the regret value is greater than r + ε, as expected.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Membership. Consider a fixed weighted automaton A = (Q, qI , A,∆, w) and a discount factor
λ ∈ (0, 1). Further, we suppose the regret of A is 0.
Let us start by defining a set of values which, intuitively, represent lower bounds on the regret Eve can
get by resolving the non-determinism of A on the fly. First, let us introduce some additional notation.
Define Aq := (Q, q,A,∆, w), i.e. the automaton A with new initial state q. For states q, q′ ∈ Q, let
µ(q, q′) := sup
(
{Aq
′
(x)−Aq(x) : x ∈ Aω} ∪ {0}
)
. We are now ready to describe our set of values:
M := {|w(p, σ, q′)− w(p, σ, q) + λ · µ(q, q′)| : p ∈ Q and q, q′ are σ-successors of p}.
Note that since A is assumed to be total (i.e., every state-action pair has at least one successor) then
M cannot be empty. Observe that, by definition, M only contains non-negative values. Since A has
regret 0, then we know that for all d ∈ (0, 1), there is a strategy σd of Eve such that reg
σd
S∃,W∀
(A) = 0.
If M 6= {0}, we let ε < λ|Q| · (minM \ {0}). Denote by Q˜ the set of states reachable from qI by reading
some finite word x of length at most |Q|,i.e. x ∈ A≤|Q|, according to σε. IfM = {0}, let Q˜ = Q. We now
define a memoryless strategy σ of Eve as follows: if M = {0} then σ is arbitrary, otherwise σ(p, a) = q
implies q ∈ Q˜. To conclude, we then show that σ ensures regret 0.
Hardness. We give a reduction from the SAT problem, i.e. satisfiability of a CNF formula. The
construction presented is based on a proof in [1]. The idea is simple: given boolean formula Φ in CNF we
construct a weighted automaton ΓΦ such that Eve can ensure regret value of 0 with a positional strategy
in ΓΦ if and only if Φ is satisfiable. Note that this restriction of Eve to positional strategies is no loss of
generality. Indeed, we have shown that if the regret of a game against an eloquent adversary is 0, then
she has a positional strategy with regret 0.
Let us now fix a boolean formula Φ in CNF with n clauses and m boolean variables x1, . . . , xm. The
weighted automaton ΓΦ = (Q, qI , A,∆, w) has alphabet A = {bail,#} ∪ {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. ΓΦ includes an
initial gadget such as the one depicted in Figure 11. Recall that this gadget forces Eve to play into the
right sub-arena. As the left sub-arena of ΓΦ we attach the gadget depicted in Figure 13. All transitions
shown have weight 1 and all missing transitions in order for ΓΦ to be complete lead to a state ⊥0 with a
self-loop on every symbol from A with weight 0. Intuitively, as Eve must go to the right sub-arena then
all alternative plays in the left sub-arena correspond to either Adam choosing a clause i and spelling
i#i to reach ⊥1 or reaching ⊥0 by playing any other sequence of symbols. The right sub-arena of the
automaton is as shown in Figure 14, where all transitions shown have weight 1 and all missing transitions
go to ⊥0 again. Here, from q0 we have transitions to state xj with symbol i if the i-th clause contains
variable xj . For every state xj we have transitions to jtrue and jfalse with symbol #. The idea is to
allow Eve to choose the truth value of xj . Finally, every state jtrue (or jfalse) has a transition to ⊥1
with symbol i if the literal xj (resp. ¬xj) appears in the i-th clause.
The argument to show that Eve can ensure regret of 0 if and only if Φ is satisfiable is straightforward.
Assume the formula is indeed satisfiable. Assume, also, that Adam chooses 1 ≤ i ≤ n and spells i#i.
Since Φ is satisfiable there is a choice of values for x1, . . . , xm such that for each clause there must be at
least one literal in the i-th clause which makes the clause true. Eve transitions, in the right sub-arena
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. . .
. . .
⊥1
1 n
# #
1 n
A, 1
Figure 13: Clause choosing gadget for the SAT reduction. There are as many paths from top to bottom
(⊥1) as there are clauses (n).
x1
1true 1false
x2
2true 2false
⊥1
1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3
# # # #
1
2, 3 1, 2
3
A, 1
Figure 14: Value choosing gadget for the SAT reduction. Depicted is the configuration for (x1 ∨ x2) ∧
(¬x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ ¬x2).
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from q0 to the corresponding value and when Adam plays # she chooses the correct truth value for the
variable. Thus, the play reaches ⊥1 and, as W = 1 in the left and right sub-arenas of ΓΦ, it follows that
her regret is 0. Indeed, her payoff will be λ2/(1 − λ)—recall the first two turns are spent in the initial
gadget, where all transitions leading to both sub-arenas are 0-weighted—which is the maximal payoff
obtainable in either sub-arena. If Adam does not play as assumed then we know all plays in ΓΦ reach ⊥0
and again her regret is 0. Note that this strategy can be realized with a positional strategy by assigning
to each xj the choice of truth value and choosing from q0 any valid transition for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Conversely, if Φ is not satisfiable then for every valuation of variables x1, . . . , xm there is at least one
clause which is not true. Given any positional strategy of Eve in ΓΦ we can extract the corresponding
valuation of the boolean variables. Now Adam chooses 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that the i-th clause is not satisfied
by the assignment. The play will therefore end in ⊥0 while an alternative play in the left sub-arena will
reach ⊥1. Hence the regret of Eve in the game is non-zero.
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